The Foundations of the American Common Market by Williams, Norman R.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 84 | Issue 1 Article 7
11-1-2008
The Foundations of the American Common
Market
Norman R. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 409 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol84/iss1/7
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
COMMON MARKET
Norman R. Williams*
The United States Constitution commits the United States to a common
market system, yet, unfortunately, the nature and scope of the American com-
mon market have been incompletely-and, at times, inconsistently-described
by the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article provides an original, theoretical
account of the Court's commitment to national economic union. As I argue,
the central constitutional commitment is one of deliberative equality-that is,
states and localities may regulate or tax interstate commerce if and only if the
government gives equal regard to similarly situated in-state and out-of-state
interests burdened by the regulation or tax. Deliberative equality provides a
powerful normative justification for the judicial review of state measures that
inhibit interstate trade. Yet, at the same time, deliberative equality provides
ample room for states to respond to public policy issues in divergent ways consis-
tent with the desires of the local citizenry. In this way, deliberative equality
offers a superior theoretical foundation than alternative theories embraced by
the Court, which overemphasize either free trade or state regulatory autonomy.
The relative superiority of deliberative equality and the defects in the alternative
approaches are both illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent decisions involv-
ing the states'power to regulate commerce, which inject further confusion into
an area already in need of analytical clarity.
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution commits the nation to a liberal,
free-trade regime among the states. That commitment is embodied in
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several constitutional provisions that limit the authority of the states to
restrict interstate trade or commerce, most notably the "dormant
Commerce Clause."' As the Supreme Court has observed, these provi-
sions effectively create a common market trading system for the
nation.2 Although the adoption of liberal international trading
regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, has prompted sub-
stantial controversy both within the United States and around the
globe,3 Americans have seemingly embraced the idea of domestic free
trade.
To say that the Constitution creates a domestic free trade regime,
though, tells us little about the nature or constitutional contours of
that system. Common market systems are neither uniform nor self-
identifying. While all common markets presuppose a reasonable
degree of mobility of goods, services, capital, and labor across interior
borders,4 such trading regimes span a spectrum from aggressive com-
mon market systems that prohibit protectionism and promote trade
harmonization (such as the European Union), 5 to more moderate
trading unions that disfavor protectionism but do not require substan-
tial trade harmonization (such as the WTO),6 to weak custom unions
that prohibit only the imposition of tariffs and quotas on member
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For close to two centuries, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the existence of a "dormant" or "negative" component of the Com-
merce Clause restricting state authority to regulate interstate commercial activities.
For a comprehensive analysis of this history, see Norman R. Williams, The Commerce
Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847 (2007). Other relevant
provisions include the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Import-
Export Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; id. art. I,
§ 10; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 380 (1976); see also
Christopher R. Drahozal, Preserving the American Common Market: State and Local Govern-
ments in the United States Supreme Court, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 233, 235 (1999) (noting
that the Dormant Commerce Clause creates an area of free trade among the states).
3 SeeJohn 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REv. 511, 512-13, 521-25 (2000) (describing the conflict surrounding free
trade policies and institutions).
4 See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union As a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 43, 60 (1988).
5 See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and
the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1199 (2006) (describ-
ing the European Union trading regime).
6 See, e.g., GAETAN VERHOOSEL, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND WTO DispuTE SETTLE-
MENT 2 (2002) (describing WTO commitment to non-discrimination without "deep
market integration").
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states' goods.7 The key question centers upon the constitutional con-
tours of the American common market. To what extent are states free
to adopt tax or regulatory measures that interfere with interstate
commerce?
This question has plagued the Court for most of its history.
Indeed, the dormant Commerce Clause is perhaps the most litigated
aspect of the U.S. Constitution, and the Court has struggled over time
to articulate a coherent approach to assessing state and local regula-
tions and taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause.8 Since the
New Deal, the Court has settled on two different normative theories as
the foundation of the dormant Commerce Clause. On the one hand,
there is the Carolene Products-style virtual representation theory,
according to which those state measures that burden politically unrep-
resented, out-of-state interests are subject to searching judicial scru-
tiny.9 On the other hand, there is the antiprotectionism theory,
according to which only those state measures that favor in-state eco-
nomic interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors are inconsis-
tent with national economic union. I0  Despite the significant
differences between these two competing theories, the Court has sig-
naled its approval of both as the touchstone of the dormant Com-
merce Clause." Indeed, in the past two years, the Court has invoked
both theories at the same time.
12
7 See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the
States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 513-14 (1997) (describing various types of free trade
unions).
8 See generally Williams, supra note I (discussing history of Supreme Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
9 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83-84 (1980) (describing representation-
reinforcing process theory of judicial review); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Com-
merce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 444 (1982) (identifying protection of representa-
tional government as a goal for judicial review of state commercial regulation); Mark
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125, 129-30
(describing more stringent judicial review where some parties' interests are systemati-
cally unrepresented).
10 Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1092 (1986).
11 Compare Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
588 (1997) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits protectionism),
with S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) (noting that the
dormant Commerce Clause serves to protect unrepresented out-of-state interests from
exploitation).
12 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); United Haulers
Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1797 (2007).
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As one might imagine, this theoretical confusion has resulted in a
tangled web of doctrinal rules. Although the Court has repeatedly
said that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits "discrimination
against interstate commerce," the Court has failed to delineate exactly
what types of measures are discriminatory,1 3 and its decisions often
appear contradictory.1 4 At the same time, the Court has also con-
demned certain types of nondiscriminatory measures, but its
approach to reviewing these measures has proven even more puzzling.
Not only has the Court failed to provide any theoretical justification
for scrutinizing nondiscriminatory measures, its decisions invoke
seemingly arbitrary distinctions between valid and invalid laws. 15 And,
while the Court has struck down several statutes for regulating extra-
territorially, it has never made clear the connection between the dor-
mant Commerce Clause and that limitation on state action. 16
These failures of theory and doctrine have led opponents of the
dormant Commerce Clause, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, to
declare that the Court's decisions make "no sense" and to urge the
Court to reform its approach to reviewing state and local regulations
of interstate trade. 17 Justice Thomas even goes so far as to advocate
13 See Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 224 (1957) ("It is recognized that 'discrimination' and 'dis-
criminatory' are not self-defining terms .... "); Collins, supra note 4, at 78 (noting
"confusion" in Court's application of anti-discrimination standard); Daniel A. Farber
& Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATTs-Eye View of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1414 (1994) (noting that "the term 'discrimi-
nation' is hardly self-explanatory, and the courts have not developed a clear test");
Graetz & Warren, supra note 5, at 1237 (noting Court's failure to implement "a coher-
ent nondiscrimination requirement"); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too
Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 55
(1981) (describing the Supreme Court's approach to discriminatory regulation as
"somewhat muddled").
14 Compare Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-52
(1977) (invalidating statute that burdened out-of-state businesses), with Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126-27 (1978) (upholding statute whose burdens
were felt almost entirely by out-of-state businesses).
15 Compare CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89-94 (1987)
(upholding state corporation statute that denied voting rights to purchaser of control-
ling block of shares in absence of approval by a majority of outstanding shares of each
class of stock), with Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982) (invalidating
statute that required Illinois Secretary of State to approve tender offers for stock of
certain corporations).
16 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986).
17 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987)
(ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kassel v. Consol. Freight-
ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declaring the
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the wholesale repudiation of the dormant Commerce Clause. 18
Others outside the Court have endorsed the dormant Commerce
Clause but have urged the Court to narrow its scope, focusing exclu-
sively on rooting out laws adopted for protectionist reasons. 19 Mean-
while, some critics urge the Court to accept protectionism in certain
circumstances. 20 Even the Clause's defenders agree that the Court's
decisions are uncertain or confusing and that the Court must do a
better job articulating the constitutional contours of the American
common market.
21
This Article disagrees with the prevailing antagonism to the dor-
mant Commerce Clause and takes up the critics' challenge, providing
an original, normative justification for the judicial review of state regu-
latory and tax measures that impact interstate trade. As I argue, the
central constitutional commitment is one of deliberative equality--that
is, states and localities may regulate or tax interstate trade if and only
Court's doctrine to be "hopelessly confused"); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Consti-
tution, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 217, 223 (contending that the Court's test for discrimina-
tion does not serve the purposes asserted in its defense).
18 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas would police egregious
instances of state protectionism under the guise of the Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause or the Article I Import-Export Clause. See Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at
263-65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Eule, supra note 9, at
446-47; Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 571; see also Steven Breker-
Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case for Judicial Non-Intervention, 690R. L. REv. 895,
935 (1990) (urging repeal of dormant Commerce Clause without replacement); Pat-
rick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. Rrv. 409, 456 (1992) (urging repeal of the
dormant Commerce Clause without indicating any constitutional provision to substi-
tute for it).
19 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 13, at 64-65 (restricting dormant Commerce Clause
review exclusively to those measures that violate the "free location" principle); Regan,
supra note 10, at 1092; Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Com-
merce, 74 CAL. L. Rv. 1203, 1243 (1986) (arguing that a purpose to benefit in-state
interests at the expense of out-of-state interests is a critical consideration in Supreme
Court decisions).
20 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 17, at 220-23 (arguing that the nondiscrimi-
nation requirement serves no valid purpose and should be rejected in toto); Paul E.
McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1191, 1194-95 (1998) (arguing that discrimination is constitutionally prohibited only
where it discourages competition or harms the national economy).
21 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 4, at 62, 78; Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen,
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv.
789, 791-93, 843 (1996); Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of
Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1853, 1869-74 (2001).
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if the state or local government gives equal regard to similarly situated
in-state and out-of-state interests burdened by the regulation or tax.
Stated differently, in considering proposed legislation, states cannot
act on parochial impulses but must be indifferent to the geographic
residence of the interests burdened by a measure-they may not dis-
count the significance of the burdens on commerce simply because
those burdens are borne by out-of-state individuals or businesses.
Deliberative equality differs from and is superior to the two pre-
vailing (and incompatible) theoretical conceptions of the dormant
Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, it is the most faithful to the
Framers' conception of the role of the Commerce Clause. Second, as
a functional matter, it best accommodates the competing constitu-
tional values of free trade and state political autonomy. In contrast,
both the virtual representation and antiprotectionism models are at
odds with the historical understanding of the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, as a functional matter, the virtual representation theory
overvalues free trade to the exclusion of federalism interests, viewing
every state commercial measure with skepticism and as worthy of judi-
cial scrutiny because of the exclusion of unrepresented out-of-state
interests. The antiprotectionism theory, in turn, overvalues federal-
ism interests to the exclusion of free trade, ignoring the fact that non-
protectionist measures can be the product of parochial considerations
and can, as a result, significantly burden interstate commerce in ways
that unjustifiably harm out-of-state interests. Deliberative equality,
which is less demanding than virtual representation and more
demanding than antiprotectionism, respects state political autonomy
by allowing states to adopt their own regulatory and tax schemes, but
it requires that states refrain from acting on parochial considerations.
Part I describes the principle of deliberative equality and shows
how it is consistent with the acknowledged, constitutionally rooted
desire to have state and local representatives respond to the needs of
their constituents. Part II then demonstrates how deliberative equal-
ity coheres with the Framers' understanding of the danger of state
regulation of interstate commerce and best accommodates the inter-
ests underlying the American common market. Part III then com-
pares the principle of deliberative equality to the virtual
representation model, showing how the latter provides an overly
broad and ultimately judicially unworkable approach to defending
interstate trade. Part IV, in turn, contrasts deliberative equality with
the antiprotectionism model, which overemphasizes state regulatory
autonomy and therefore underprotects interstate trade. Finally, Part
V considers the Court's recent decisions in United Haulers Ass'n v.
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority22 and Department of
Revenue v. Davis,23 demonstrating that the Court's confusion regard-
ing the underlying theoretical conception of the dormant Commerce
Clause produced an unstable doctrinal resolution. As this concluding
Part shows, deliberative equality would have provided a more sound
and attractive foundation for resolving those and other cases.
I. DELIBERATIVE EQUALITY AND FREE TRADE
The American common market serves important political and
economic values, but those values cannot be promoted to the exclu-
sion of state regulatory autonomy. Rather, there is a need for a theo-
retical account that accommodates and synthesizes the constitutional
interest in free trade and the acknowledged federalism-based need to
respect state legislative autonomy. In subpart A, I describe the princi-
ple of deliberative equality, showing how it accommodates these com-
peting constitutional values. In subpart B, I then address the scope of
the model-to what types of state actions the model applies-showing
how the model is consistent with the acknowledged desire to have
state and local representatives work for the benefit of their
constituents.
A. The Deliberative Equality Model
The most robust protection for the common market would be a
requirement that states actually treat in-state and out-of-state interests
equally. Such an imposing demand, however, would virtually elimi-
nate state legislative autonomy because every state commercial regula-
tion or tax adversely affects some out-of-state interests. To use a
hypothetical made famous by Donald Regan, suppose that a state bans
plastic widgets solely because of environmental concerns about the
disposal of plastic items. 24 Suppose further that all plastic widget man-
ufacturers are out-of-state and that the state has a thriving wooden
widget industry. To require this state to give equal treatment to out-
of-state goods and services-to treat plastic widgets like wooden wid-
gets merely because the former are from out-of-state-would preclude
the state from addressing its legitimate environmental concerns about
plastic widgets. In short, equal treatment is simply too imposing a
constitutional requirement to undergird the American common
market.
22 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
23 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
24 Regan, supra note 21, at 1857-58.
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Although states must remain free to treat out-of-state interests dif-
ferently or worse than in-state interests when justified, there is the
obvious need to prevent such differential treatment from occurring
because of a legislature's hostility or indifference to out-of-state inter-
ests. The instinctive reaction to the plastic widget ban changes dra-
matically if the legislature's purpose was not to protect the
environment but to favor in-state wooden widget manufacturers. This
problem can be addressed by diluting the constitutional requirement:
states need not actually accord equal treatment to out-of-state interests,
but rather only give equal regard to such out-of-state interests as they
give to similarly situated in-state interests. Viewed in this way, the con-
stitutional commitment to a common market within the American
federal union permits states and local governments to enact commer-
cial measures-it does not disable states entirely from regulating com-
merce-but it does require that state and local policymaking bodies
give equal regard to similarly situated out-of-state and in-state interests
adversely affected or burdened by such measures. States may not treat
the concerns of out-of-state interests worse than those of like in-state
interests simply because of their state residence. This is the principle
of deliberative equality.
While deliberative equality does not require equality of treat-
ment, it does obviously condemn parochialism (favoritism toward in-
state interests) in the legislature's consideration of commercial regula-
tions or taxes. Such parochialism is manifestly apparent in protection-
ist measures-statutes whose aim and effect is to benefit in-state
interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. For example, a
state considering a tariff on out-of-state goods obviously is treating the
burden imposed on the out-of-state producers as immaterial because
of their out-of-state status-indeed, the whole purpose of such protec-
tionist measures is to transfer wealth from the out-of-state interests to
the "protected" in-state competitors.
Protectionism, though the most obvious, is only one form in
which states may exhibit parochial impulses or considerations of the
sort condemned by deliberative equality. Parochialism may also lead
states to adopt needlessly burdensome regulatory schemes that differ
from other states' rules or to tax interstate trade more than purely
intrastate commerce. Stated differently, parochialism can manifest
itself in non-protectionist measures that pose the problem of regula-
tory or tax harmonization. For example, suppose a state (State A)
requires candy manufacturers to print a warning about the dangers of
obesity on all candy bars sold in the state. The content of the warn-
ing, though, differs from that specified by other states, thereby requir-
ing candy manufactures to print different labels for State A's
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market. 25 This regulatory measure is nonprotectionist-it burdens
both in-state and out-of-state candy manufacturers equally-but it
imposes significant costs on candy manufacturers, which must print
special labels for State A-destined candy bars. Now suppose that the
state legislature, in considering this proposed measure, notes that it
will likely generate $15 million a year in benefits (in the form of
decreased costs for obesity-related health care, etc.). And, now sup-
pose that the legislature notes that, while the total cost of this measure
nationally will be $40 million (the total cost for all candy manufactur-
ers to print special labels), in-state businesses account for only $10
million of this loss. Expressly noting that the in-state benefits exceed
the in-state costs, the legislature enacts this measure.
In this hypothetical, the legislature has violated the principle of
deliberative equality. It treated the burden of the proposed measure
on out-of-state interests differently from the burden on in-state inter-
ests. Specifically, the legislature considered the measure's cost on in-
state candy manufacturers, but it disregarded entirely the measure's
impact on out-of-state manufacturers merely because they were out-of-
state. Indeed, the only reason that the measure passed was because of
the legislature's parochial concern only with the costs borne by in-
state manufacturers.
Of course, not every burdensome regulation or tax is the product
of parochialism and therefore violative of deliberative equality. Take,
for example, the same proposed candy warning label requirement,
but now suppose that State A's warning label is much more effective at
discouraging obesity than the warnings required by other states. As a
consequence, the measure will generate $50 million in benefits for
State A, while the costs remain the same. Acknowledging the costs on
both in-state and out-of-state manufacturers, the legislature enacts the
measure, once again noting that the benefits outweigh the costs. In
this hypothetical, there is no violation of the principle of deliberative
equality. The legislature did not treat out-of-state costs differently
from in-state costs. Indeed, the state treated both in-state and out-of-
state candy manufacturers with equal regard despite their different
locations. The measure passed because the legislature believed that
the benefits outweighed the costs, both in-state and out-of-state.
As these two examples demonstrate, the principle of deliberative
equality does not obliterate the states as sovereign, legal entities. Each
state is free to adopt its own policies and may do so even if out-of-state
25 Cf Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating state
law requiring interstate trucks to have curved mudflaps, while other states did not
require such mudflaps or required straight mudflaps).
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interests are adversely affected to a substantial degree (as in the sec-
ond hypothetical). Moreover, states are free to evaluate and weigh
the benefits of state action differently than other states; one state may
properly value the benefit of a healthy citizenry (or a clean environ-
ment) more highly than another state. In fact, in considering
whether to adopt a particular regulation or tax, states need not use
cost-benefit analysis or even consider the burden on out-of-state inter-
ests. 26 The only limitation is that, to the extent that states consider
the degree to which a proposed measure burdens in-state interests,
they must also consider and accord the same weight to burdens on
out-of-state interests.
Lastly in this regard, deliberative equality differs from and should
not be confused with the more demanding requirement that states act
in the nation's best interest-that states act in the nation-regarding
manner expected of Congress.27 Were Congress to consider a
national candy labeling requirement, for example, we would expect it
to measure the costs and benefits to all interests in the nation. In
contrast, the principle of deliberative equality requires equal regard
only for out-of-state interests burdened by a proposed regulation or
tax; it does not require equal regard for out-of-state interests benefited
by the regulation or tax. The reason for this omission is that the latter
requirement would be inconsistent with our conception of federalism,
which requires that states do no harm to other states but does not
require that states act for the benefit of outsiders. 28 Suppose that a
state was considering a measure whose costs would be borne almost
exclusively by in-state residents and whose benefits would accrue
almost entirely to out-of-state residents. Even if the measure's benefits
to the nation outweighed its costs, it would be strange to say that the
state is required, as a constitutional matter, to enact the measure-it
26 A state, for example, might properly view the preservation of human life in
certain contexts as sufficiently important as to justify any cost. See Bhd. of Locomotive
Firemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., Co., 393 U.S. 129, 139-40 (1968).
27 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(remarking that in a republic the public views may be "refine [d] and enlarge[d] by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discover the true interests of their country").
28 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) (noting that Illinois
has no legitimate interest in regulating tender offers for the benefit of out-of-state
shareholders); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935) (noting that
New York has no legitimate interest in setting minimum price for milk for the benefit
of Vermont dairy farmers). When the Constitution requires states to undertake
action for the benefit of outsiders, it says so explicitly. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
(Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (Extradition and Fugitive Slave
Clauses), repealed in part by id. amend. XIII.
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might be nice for the state to enact the measure but not compulsory
for it to do so.
B. Deliberative Equality and Permissible Forms of Parochialism
Deliberative equality obviously restricts states' ability to act on
parochial impulses. Curiously, it is precisely this feature of delibera-
tive equality that prompts the most vigorous criticism. The principal
objection to deliberative equality is that, by condemning parochialism,
it expects too much from state and local lawmakers and is inconsistent
with our constitutional commitment to state autonomy, which-so the
argument goes-empowers state and local officials to act in a paro-
chial fashion to address the needs and desires of local constituen-
cies.29 As Earl Maltz has put it, "to establish local governments
designed to respond to local needs and then question actions by those
governments because of a lack of national perspective would be
almost perversely incongruous."30 Indeed, as evidence of the constitu-
tional propriety of parochialism, proponents of this view point to the
so-called "market participant" exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause, which allows state and local governments to favor local busi-
nesses when acting as a market participant rather than market
regulator.31
The problem with this objection to deliberative equality is that it
overstates the case for parochialism. To begin with, the notion that
state autonomy permits states to act on whatever impulses or consider-
ations that they want is erroneous. The Constitution restricts state leg-
islative considerations in numerous ways; for example, state legislators
cannot act with racial32 or sexist33 animus. Thus, the point cannot be
that federalism entitles states to do and think as they please; rather,
the point must be more limited-that parochialism in particular is
constitutionally protected as a concomitant part of state sovereignty.
But why would that be?
29 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 80; Regan, supra note 10, at 1165.
30 Maltz, supra note 13, at 80; see also Regan, supra note 10, at 1164-65 ("Nonrep-
resentation of foreign interests follows from the simple fact that there are separate
states; and the existence of separate states, while it might be a defect in an ideal
political system, can hardly be treated as a defect in ours.").
31 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435-39 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806-10 (1976); Maltz, supra note 13, at 68.
32 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("[R]ace-based districting by
our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.").
33 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (noting that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids treating women differently merely because of their
gender).
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There is surely no constitutional obligation for a legislature to act
on parochial considerations; a state legislator who gives serious con-
sideration to out-of-state or national interests has not violated any con-
stitutional duty, state or federal. Nor can it be that parochialism is a
constitutional right of state and local legislatures. The Constitution
expressly prohibits states from disparaging out-of-state interests in cer-
tain contexts,3 4 and even the critics offer alternative accounts of the
dormant Commerce Clause that restrict state legislative parochial-
ism. 35 Moreover, if Congress were to adopt a statute preempting state
and local commercial measures adopted with a parochial bias, surely
no one would contest the statute's constitutionality. Parochial atti-
tudes are undoubtedly the product of state and local officials' geo-
graphically limited electoral accountability, but to acknowledge that
parochialism is likely is not to say that it is constitutionally protected.
But what about the market participant exception? Does not its
existence demonstrate that parochialism is constitutionally accept-
able? This is not the place for a full exploration of the market partici-
pant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause, 6 but a cursory
review of the basis for the exception illuminates the limited extent to
which it sanctions parochialism and, more importantly, how delibera-
tive equality is consistent with a limited exception for parochialism in
nonregulatory contexts.
Deliberative equality establishes the general, background consti-
tutional rule: states and local governments may not use their regula-
tory or taxation powers in a parochial fashion.3 7 As discussed more
fully below,38 deliberative equality's prohibition on such types of mea-
sures is both faithful to the Framers' desire to prevent parochialism in
the regulation of commerce and is desirable as a constitutional matter
because it promotes national economic union, discourages interstate
rivalries, and encourages national economic growth. Parochially moti-
vated taxes or regulations imperil all three values by fragmenting the
34 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1
(Privileges and Immunities Clauses).
35 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 64-65 (arguing that states may not act to disadvan-
tage out-of-state interests); Regan, supra note 10, at 1165 (arguing that states may not
act with protectionist intent).
36 For those interested in such matters, see, for example, Dan T. Coenen, Untan-
gling the Market Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MIcH. L. REV.
395 (1989); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L.
REX'. 487, 499-508 (1981); and Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State
Citizenship, the Market, and the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (2008).
37 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977).
38 See discussion infra Part II1.
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national economy, inviting interstate trade wars, and reducing overall
national economic output. A tariff on out-of-state goods provides a
classic example of such dangers: tariffs hinder the interstate trade in
goods and services and invite retaliatory tariffs from other states. 39 As
a consequence, the Supreme Court has been notably hostile to tariffs
and other forms of state regulation that operate in practice as a
tariff.40 Were, for example, the State of Oregon to forbid the importa-
tion of California wines, there would be no doubt that the Court
would strike down the measure.
4 1
Deliberative equality, however, does not condemn all forms of
parochially motivated legislative action. Specifically, deliberative
equality does not apply to those state actions for which state citizens
have uniquely borne the cost. The classic example is a state's decision
to purchase supplies for state use exclusively from local suppliers. In
this situation, the state is deciding how to use its own funds, which are
raised predominantly from taxes on in-state citizens. Thus, while Ore-
gon may not ban private individuals from purchasing California wines,
there would surely be no problem from the standpoint of deliberative
equality with the Governor of Oregon choosing to serve only Oregon
wines at dinners or receptions at the Governor's mansion.
This distinction between parochial regulations and taxes, on the
one hand, and parochial spending programs, on the other hand, is
rooted in sound, theoretical considerations. When a state regulates or
taxes interstate commerce, it is not distributing any good or service
paid for by state citizens. In such situations, the demands of delibera-
tive equality are not counterbalanced by any opposing, fairness-based
need to favor in-state residents. Indeed, if anything, the selective
imposition of taxes and regulations on out-of-state interests is unfair.
In contrast, when a state spends taxpayer dollars, it is fair as a matter
of political justice for state citizens to demand that those funds be
used for the benefit of state residents. 4 2 It is they, not nonresidents,
who are the ones predominately paying such taxes, and, therefore, it
is just that the state attempt to use such taxes for the citizens' benefit.
Moreover, were the rule any other, certain types of public goods
would never be produced by state or local governments because of the
free rider problem. Few, if any, states would undertake expensive
social programs, such as creating subsidized state universities, if the
costs were borne exclusively by in-state citizens but the benefits were
39 See, e.g., Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Williams, supra note 36, at 492-94.
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shared with free-riding nonresidents, who did not contribute to the
cost of the program. 43 In short, parochialism in the distribution of
state taxpayer funds is both fair and necessary to remedy potential
free rider problems in the provision of public benefits.
Lastly, as a doctrinal matter, this distinction between parochial
regulations and taxes, on the one hand, and parochial spending pro-
grams, on the other hand, forms the essence of the "market partici-
pant" exception. Every case in which the Court has applied the
exception has involved state or local distribution of taxpayer owned or
funded resources. Thus, for example, the Court has upheld the con-
stitutionality of South Dakota's policy of restricting the sale of cement
produced at a state-owned plant exclusively to state residents. 44 Like-
wise, the Court upheld the City of Boston's regulation requiring all
contractors on city-funded construction projects to employ a specified
percentage of city residents on the public works. 45 When Massachu-
setts imposed a milk tax that fell exclusively on private out-of-state
dairies, however, the Court condemned the measure.
46
In sum, deliberative equality condemns parochially motivated
taxes and regulations. In deciding whether and how to use their regu-
latory and taxation powers, state and local governments must not
weigh the interests of in-state citizens and nonresidents differently-
that is, they may not discount the costs borne by out-of-state residents
merely because of their out-of-state status. At the same time, however,
deliberative equality does not forbid states from spending taxpayer
funds for the exclusive or predominant benefit of in-state residents, as
the market participant exception permits. Stated differently, delibera-
tive equality is fully consistent with our constitutional commitment to
have state and local officials respond to local needs.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR DELIBERATIVE EQuALITY
With the foregoing description and understanding of deliberative
equality in mind, the obvious question is whether deliberative equality
43 Id.
44 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980); see also Chance Mgmt., Inc.
v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1114 (8th Cir. 1996) (allowing the state of South
Dakota-as market participant-to institute an in-state ownership requirement for
video lottery machine companies).
45 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employees, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 215 (1983).
Likewise, lower courts have upheld state purchasing programs that contain prefer-
ences for local vendors and products. See Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procure-
ment Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (4th Cir. 1994); J.F. Shea Co. v. City of
Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 748-50 (7th Cir. 1993).
46 SeeW. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994).
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is rooted in the Constitution. Why should we read the Constitution to
embody the principle of deliberative equality? For two reasons: first,
deliberative equality is consistent with the Framers' understanding of
the dangers of state taxation of interstate commerce, and, second, it
offers the best accommodation of the political values underlying the
dormant Commerce Clause.
A. The Framers' Fear of Parochialism
As Albert Abel exhaustively documented, the Framers of the Con-
stitution understood the Commerce Clause to limit state authority
over interstate commerce so as to promote interstate trade.4 7 The
weaknesses of the Confederation era system of commercial regulation,
in which commercial regulation and taxation was left principally to
the states, 48 was one of the primary reasons that the Constitutional
Convention was called. 49 That concern regarding state commercial
authority carried over into the Convention, at which there was univer-
sal agreement that the power over interstate commerce had to be
transferred from the states to Congress. Significantly, the delegates
viewed the Clause less as the fount of federal legislative authority and
47 See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941).
48 The Articles of Confederation left it to each state to regulate trade. The Arti-
cles empowered Congress to regulate trade with Indians but only to the extent that
"the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated."
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1781). Similarly, Congress could enter into
treaties with foreign powers, but "no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the
legislative power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such
imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are subjected to, or from
prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities
whatsoever." Id.
49 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) ("The sole
purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the
Constitution was to take into consideration the trade of the United States .... (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 259, at 240 (photo. reprint 1991) (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (noting that during the Confederation era, "each state
would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of its own
products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its position in a political or
commercial view"); Collins, supra note 4, at 52 (noting that most historians believe
that commercial issues prompted the Constitutional Convention); Eule, supra note 9,
at 430, 435 (noting that fear of commercial warfare among states "is almost uniformly
conceded to be the primary, if not sole, catalyst for the convention of 1787" and that
"the Constitutional Convention was prompted by commercial protectionism").
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more as a restriction on state authority. 50 Indeed, as Abel concluded,
the delegates assumed that the federal commerce power within its
domain was exclusive and "presupposed the withdrawal of authority
pari passu from the states.
5 1
Although there was widespread agreement regarding the need to
divest states of their authority over interstate commerce, there was lit-
tle discussion of the exact type of state measures that the Clause was
meant to forbid. 52 Nevertheless, what little discussion there was at the
Constitutional Convention indicated hostility to parochial measures
that favored in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests.
53
Several delegates expressed fear that, if states were left with legislative
control over commerce, they would enact nakedly parochial mea-
sures, such as taxes on in-transit goods from outside the state destined
for market elsewhere.54 Significantly, their concerns were mollified by
50 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1125. The Commerce Clause itself was approved
unanimously without dissent or substantial debate. See Abel, supra note 47, at 444.
Moreover, the few times that interstate trade was discussed by the delegates, they
expressed their expectation that the Clause would prevent states from adopting hos-
tile or discriminatory measures that injured other states. See id. at 470 & n.169; see also
id. at 471 ("There is thus not a single occasion in the proceedings of the convention
itself where the grant of power over commerce between the states was advanced as the
basis for independent affirmative regulation by the federal government. Instead, it
was uniformly mentioned as a device for preventing obstructive or partial regulations
by the states.").
51 Abel, supra note 47, at 493. Any doubt on this score was settled by James
Madison, the primary architect of the Constitution, who acknowledged many years
later that the Commerce Clause was intended to operate as a restriction on state
authority. See Letter from James Madison toJ.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 14, 14-15 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co.
1865); see also Letter from James Madison to Prof. Davis (1832), in 4 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra, at 232, 251-54 (noting the "transfer of the
power [to tax imports and exports] to a common authority capable of exercising it
with effect"). This expectation manifested itself in other constitutional provisions
that divest states of authority to restrict trade among the states. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cls. 2, 3; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
52 See Abel, supra note 47, at 470 (noting that, in the Convention records, there
are only six references to the type of state measures condemned by the Clause).
53 Id. (noting that all references involved "discriminatory" measures).
54 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 21, 1787)
[hereinafter Madison, August 21 Notes], in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 355, 359-60 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (noting that when John
Langdon of New Hampshire expressed concern that some states would levy export
taxes on in-transit goods produced in other states, Oliver Ellsworth reassured him that
the Commerce Clause would protect states from such measures); James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 28, 1787) [hereinafter Madison,
August 28 Notes], in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at
437, 440-41 (noting that, when James Madison moved to ban states from laying
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reassurances from other delegates that the Commerce Clause barred
such measures.
55
Moreover, once the struggle for ratification began, the need to
constitutionally ban such parochialism became an enduring theme of
the Federalists' campaign. Writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton criticized the "interfering and unneighborly reg-
ulations" of commerce adopted by some states that treated residents
of other states "in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens."
56
Hamilton's choice of language is instructive; his concern that states
would treat nonresidents like "foreigners" signals very plainly that it is
parochialism that is the evil to which the Commerce Clause is
addressed. In a similar fashion, James Madison warned of the likeli-
hood that, without the Constitution, seaboard states would use their
control over seaborne commerce to collect "indirect revenue" from
consumers in inland states. 57 Once again, the example selected is tell-
ing. Madison's fear was that states would impose taxes on out-of-state
individuals that they were not prepared to bear themselves-an obvi-
ous violation of deliberative equality.
To be sure, neither Madison nor any other of the Framers spoke
expressly in terms of deliberative equality, and, for that reason, I do
not make a strong originalist claim that the Framers consciously
intended the courts to enforce the principle of deliberative equality.
Rather, my claim is a more modest but equally powerful one-that the
principle of deliberative equality offers the best way of understanding
what the Framers thought and sought to do. Given the paucity of dis-
cussion regarding the matter, any theory of the dormant Commerce
Clause-whether it is the virtual representation theory or antiprotec-
tionist model-must necessarily rest on such interpretive inferences
about how best to make sense of what few statements the Framers did
utter on the subject. In my view, the best reading of the historical
record suggests that the Framers feared the consequences of allowing
states to adopt parochial commercial measures. Indeed, as discussed
more fully below, 58 it is the competing theories of the dormant Com-
merce Clause that are ahistorical.
import embargoes, Gouverneur Morris responded that the measure was unnecessary
because the power to regulate interstate trade was vested in the general government
by Commerce Clause).
55 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 54.
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 144-45.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 267-68.
58 See infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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B. Accommodating Free Trade and Federalism
In addition to its historical pedigree, deliberative equality is also
constitutionally desirable because it best accommodates the compet-
ing interests underlying the American common market. Free trade
among the states is constitutionally favored for three reasons: to pro-
mote political union, to reduce the likelihood of interstate retaliation,
and to foster economic wealth. At the same time, however, the need
to preserve state regulatory and taxation autonomy requires that states
be allowed to adopt commercial regulations and taxes of their own
choosing, which will inevitably disrupt free interstate trade to some
degree.
1. Political Union
The first and most important value promoted by the Constitu-
tion's protection for free trade is political union. Free trade promotes
political union by encouraging the economic integration of the
states.59 The dangers to political union are particularly apparent in
the context of protectionist measures. Excluding out-of-state goods
and services merely because of their origin signals in a potent fashion
that the manufacturers of the excluded goods are not members of the
same political community as in-state manufacturers. 60 In effect, the
excluding state is saying to out-of-state companies: "You're not one of
us; you're a foreigner whom we need not treat equally with our own
residents." Such attempts at economic isolationism only serve to rein-
force nativist impulses for political isolation, and, for that reason, the
Court has viewed such protectionist measures as hostile to national
political union. As Justice Cardozo eloquently put it in striking down
a protectionist state regulation, the Constitution "was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division. '6 1 More recently (and earnestly), the Court
declared that the suppression of such protectionist impulses "is essen-
tial to the foundations of the Union."
62
Though less apparent, nonprotectionist but burdensome com-
mercial regulations and taxes also undermine political union. Sub-
jecting interstate commerce to a multitude of burdensome and
divergent regulations and taxes only serves to disrupt interstate trade
59 See, e.g.,Jim Chen & DanielJ. Gifford, Law As Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis
of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1322-23 (1995).
60 Regan, supra note 10, at 1113.
61 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
62 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005).
[VOL. 84:1
2008] FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 427
and concomitantly promote the economic isolation of each state,
which in turn encourages political isolation. Indeed, it was Alexander
Hamilton who first warned of the political dangers of such conflicting
regulatory measures, declaring that "the gradual conflicts of State reg-
ulations" would induce state citizens to view nonresidents as "foreign-
ers and aliens"63-hardly a desirable result in a constitutional system
dedicated to political union.
Deliberative equality obviously promotes political union by
requiring states to give equal regard to interests located in other
states. This equality of regard reduces the salience of independent
state identities and emphasizes that, when it comes to the regulation
or taxation of interstate commerce, we are all viewed as citizens of the
same economic unit regardless of our state residence. In this respect,
deliberative equality makes real the Framers' promise that, as Justice
Jackson breathlessly intoned, "our economic unit is the Nation.
64
2. Retaliation
Closely related to the first concern with political union is the sec-
ond: that trade-inhibiting state regulations and taxes are likely to
encourage retaliatory measures by those states whose citizens are
adversely affected by the measures. 65 Once again, the likelihood of
such commercial reprisals if the states were left to their own devices
was a prevalent concern of the Framers. "Competitions of com-
merce," Hamilton warned, "would be another fruitful source of con-
tention. '66 Elaborating, Hamilton pointed to "those regulations of
trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive
benefits to their own citizens" and predicted that "[t] he infractions of
these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them,
on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals
and wars.."
67
Not surprisingly, this concern has found expression in many judi-
cial decisions reviewing state commercial measures. Condemning a
law that restricted the export of milk to other states, Justice Jackson
expressly adverted to the likelihood of punitive reprisals were such
economic embargoes allowed:
63 THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 145.
64 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537; see also Collins, supra
note 4, at 45 ("Economic union was unquestionably a principal aim of the framers.").
65 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1114; Smith, supra note 19, at 1208.
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 62.
67 Id. at 63.
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We need only consider the consequences if each of the few states
that produce copper, lead, high-grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil
or gas should decree that industries located in that state shall have
priority. What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals
would ensue if such practices were begun! Or suppose that the field
of discrimination and retaliation be industry. May Michigan pro-
vide that automobiles cannot be taken out of that State until local
dealers' demands are fully met? Would she not have every argu-
ment in the favor of such a statute that can be offered in support of
New York's limiting sales of milk for out-of-state shipment to protect
the economic interests of her competing dealers and local consum-
ers? Could Ohio then pounce upon the rubber-tire industry, on
which she has a substantial grip, to retaliate for Michigan's auto
monopoly?
68
In short, protectionism-in whatever form-only encourages further
protectionism, thereby threatening to ignite a trade war among the
states. 69
More recently, the Court condemned "an ongoing, low-level
trade war" involving the direct shipment of wine to consumers from
wineries. 70 Twenty-six states allowed the direct shipment of wines to
some extent, but some states, such as Michigan and New York, for-
bade direct shipment by out-of-state wineries, and thirteen states
closed their markets to wineries from states that did not reciprocally
allow the direct shipment of wine from their wineries. 71 These restric-
tions, according to the Court, generated trade hostility among the
states and encouraged the proliferation of retaliatory measures.
Indeed, the Court noted that, in 1986, in response to other states'
protection of local wineries, California rescinded its policy of allowing
68 H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 538-39; see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits "laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Consti-
tution was designed to prevent").
69 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) (noting that protection-
ist measures open the door "to rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by
subjecting commerce between the states to the power of the nation"). Once again,
the adoption of nonprotectionist but unduly burdensome regulations or taxes may
also exacerbate interstate trade relations. Take, for example, a statute that limits the
lengths of trains in a state. Cf S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 763 (1945) (invali-
dating Arizona train limit law that forbade trains with more than fourteen passenger
cars or seventy freight cars). The measure is nonprotectionist, but it will impose sub-
stantial costs on out-of-state companies, who, in turn, may lobby their own states to
adopt nondiscriminatory regulations or taxes that impose severe costs on companies
located in the original state.
70 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005).
71 Id. at 467-68.
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direct shipments of wine from all wineries and adopted its reciprocity
statute, closing its wine market to direct shipments from wineries in
states that did not allow the direct shipment of Californian wines.
72
As should be obvious, the principle of deliberative equality mini-
mizes the likelihood of retaliatory trade wars among the states by
requiring each state to give equal regard to like out-of-state interests.
True, a state whose domestic industry is burdened by a valid regula-
tion or tax adopted by another state may still feel the desire to retali-
ate,73 but that urge will be tempered, if not eliminated, in most cases
by the first state's knowledge that the enacting state gave equal regard
to its businesses. Knowing that one's interests have been considered
and treated equally with others-that the principle of deliberative
equality has been observed-does much to take the sting out of any
loss and diminish the impetus to retaliate.
Of course, not everyone agrees that interstate commercial strife-
or at least its possibility-is either undesirable or inevitable. Edmund
Kitch, for instance, has argued that there is no need to constitutional-
ize a rule in favor of free trade because, left to their own devices, the
states will negotiate an optimum level of market access via bilateral or
multilateral trade agreements.7" On this view, the threat of retaliation
is a beneficial and inherent part of such a negotiation-based trading
regime that encourages states to reach mutually beneficial accommo-
dations. Indeed, the international trading regime is built upon such a
negotiated structure. In other words, what's good enough for the
international realm is good enough for the national realm too, and,
on this view, deliberative equality is an unnecessary ingredient of the
American common market.
Although interesting, this challenge to deliberative equality is
overstated. First, the notion that states must negotiate market access
in other states under threat of retaliation is in tension with the con-
cept of federal union discussed above. Oregonians would rightly be
dismayed that their ability to sell goods in California is wholly contin-
gent upon California agreeing to accept Oregon-made goods-that,
despite each state being equal members of the United States, it is
within California's right to exclude Oregon goods subject only to the
sanction that Oregon may do likewise to California's goods. Indeed,
the Court has expressly declared that the states "should not be com-
pelled to negotiate with each other regarding favored or disfavored
72 Id. at 473.
73 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1133.
74 Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9, 13-14 (A. Dan Tarlock ed., 1981).
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status for their own citizens. States do not need, and may not attempt,
to negotiate with other States regarding their mutual economic inter-
ests. '75 For this reason, the Court has been rightly hostile to reciproc-
ity agreements in which a state conditions market access for another
state's goods upon similar access for its goods.
76
Nor has the analogy to the international trading system proved
persuasive, at least to the Court. To the contrary, the Court has point-
edly rejected it, observing that "[h] owever available such methods [of
negotiation and retaliation] in an international system of trade
between wholly sovereign nation states, they may not constitutionally
be employed by the States that constitute the common market created
by the Framers of the Constitution. '77 In the Court's view, the states
do not occupy the same constitutional status vis-A-vis one another as
sovereign nations do; while the United States may use negotiation and
the threat of retaliation in its dealings with foreign nations, the states
may not act in a similar fashion.
Second, even if a negotiation-based trading system were constitu-
tionally consistent with the American federal union, there are several
reasons to be skeptical that a negotiation-based trading regime would
produce an optimum level of market access. States may play favorites
in dispensing market access, with particularly undesirable conse-
quences for small or distant states. It is easy to believe that California
would open its markets to goods from Oregon, Texas, or Florida, but
what about New Hampshire or Rhode Island? That Rhode Island
might close its market to goods from California might not trouble Cal-
ifornia in the least. Moreover, even with regard to those states that
reach negotiated trade agreements, the ensuing trade agreements
might only partially liberalize trade in goods and services. Indeed, the
numerous exceptions to free trade contained in international trading
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, indicate that states will
not always perceive the benefits of free trade and agree to liberal trad-
ing regimes. 78 And, of course, trade wars are nasty things. While it is
75 Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472.
76 See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976) (invalidating
a Mississippi milk reciprocity requirement); see also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473 (criticiz-
ing reciprocity requirements).
77 Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 380.
78 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, A60-A63, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183
(1995).
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not guaranteed that trade wars between various states would erupt in a
negotiation-based trading regime, there is no guarantee that they
would not either. For these reasons, it is entirely understandable for
federal unions such as the United States to wish to minimize the cir-
cumstances likely to trigger such interstate trade tensions, as delibera-
tive equality does.
3. Economic Efficiency
Finally, state restrictions on interstate trade are inefficient and
reduce overall national wealth. 79 This is the classic case for free trade
made by David Ricardo in the nineteenth century.80  Of course,
Ricardo was addressing trade among nations, but the principle is the
same within a federal system of government. Because of the principle
of comparative advantage, even a state that is inefficient in producing
goods or services stands to gain by trading with other states that are
more efficient in producing such goods or services. 11 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has favorably noted the wealth gains that have
accrued to states by virtue of the American common market system.
8 2
Deliberative equality, by restricting state parochial impulses and
thereby promoting interstate trade, fosters national economic growth.
Of course, the notion that economic efficiency has (or should
have) some constitutional status troubles many individuals.8 3 To sug-
gest that the Constitution protects economic efficiency-much less
that courts should enforce such protection-seems at first glance to
urge a reprisal of the Lochner era, when the federal courts aggressively
policed state regulations in the name of a laissez faire capitalist ideol-
ogy.84 Lochner v. New York 5 and its progeny were properly con-
79 Regan, supra note 21, at 1880; Smith, supra note 19, at 1208. But see Collins,
supra note 4, at 63 (contesting the claim that economic efficiency is constitutional
value).
80 See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(3d ed. 1821), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 128,
128-49 (Piero Sraffa ed., Liberty Fund 1951).
81 For a complete discussion of the theory of comparative advantage, see PAUL R.
KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (6th ed. 2003).
82 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949) ("The material
success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make up this federal free
trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce .
83 See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 13, at 79-80.
84 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating mini-
mum wage for women), overruled by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hour legisla-
tion for bakers).
85 198 U.S. 45.
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demned on the ground that there was no constitutional commitment
to a particular economic model-that decisions regarding the econ-
omy are appropriately left to the political sphere.86 If a state wishes to
enact legislation that is economically inefficient, so be it. Indeed,
after the demise of Lochner during the New Deal,8 7 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a number of measures that were economically
inefficient.88 Drawing upon this universal criticism of Lochner, critics
such as Earl Maltz point out that there is no more basis for courts to
police against inefficiency caused by protectionism or trade dishar-
mony than inefficiency caused by burdensome taxes or regulations.
8 9
The Constitution, so the argument goes, is indifferent to both types of
measures, which are therefore left to the political process.
There are two available responses: one could either agree with
the substance of the criticism but argue that Lochner's endorsement of
laissez faire capitalism was right, or one could attempt to distinguish
wealth gains from a common market system from wealth gains pro-
duced by a free market system, arguing that only the former deserve
constitutional protection. The first response is a non-starter. Hostility
to Lochner is virtually universal, shared by both conservative and liberal
jurists and commentators alike.90 As a consequence, proponents of
the American common market must identify how inefficiency caused
by protectionism or regulatory disharmony differs from the run-of-the-
mill inefficiency caused by any governmental intrusion into the mar-
ket economy and, more importantly, to demonstrate how that differ-
ence justifies intrusive judicial review in the name of the American
common market.
86 See, e.g., Tyson & Brother United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
87 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400 (overruling Adkins).
88 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
89 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 80; McGinley, supra note 18, at 436-37.
90 See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 429 (2001) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (opinion joined by Justices White,
Scalia, and Thomas); Eule, supra note 9, at 438 (noting the "mistake" of Lochner). A
notable exception is Mark Tushnet, who sees no distinction between inefficiency
caused by trade disruption and inefficiency caused by run-of-the-mill regulatory mea-
sures and who endorses judicial review under substantive due process in both con-
texts. See Tushnet, supra note 9, at 148.
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a. Unjustified Inefficiency
Attempting to distinguish inefficiency caused by trade-restrictive
measures from inefficiency generally, Donald Regan contends that
protectionism is inefficient in a constitutionally troubling way
"because it diverts business away from presumptively low-cost produc-
ers without any colorable justification in terms of a benefit that
deserves approval from the point of view of the nation as a whole"-
what he subsequently calls a "federally cognizable benefit."9' Regan
defines that concept by example. He tells us that a tariff does not
generate such a benefit because the gain to the importing/tax-collect-
ing state is offset by the loss to exporting/tax-paying states-there is
no net gain to the nation as a whole.92 Yet, it is clear that Regan does
not mean to engage in some crude, utilitarian analysis, weighing gains
achieved by one state against costs incurred by others. Rather, Regan
offers Oregon's bottle bill, which imposes sizable costs on out-of-state
bottlers and beverage distributors as an example of a law that confers
a federally cognizable benefit-here, the elimination of litter.93 Why,
despite the high costs imposed on out-of-state interests, is the elimina-
tion of litter a federally cognizable benefit? Not because the benefits
outweigh the measure's cost, but because, as Regan declares, "Oregon
says it is.'
'94
This is an imaginative approach, but it all hinges on the ability to
identify "federally cognizable benefits," whose presence renders ineffi-
ciency constitutionally unproblematic. And therein lies the problem.
Allowing each state to define for itself what constitutes a "federally
cognizable benefit" strips the concept of any meaning: it is whatever a
state says it is. Moreover, and as a consequence, the concept loses any
limiting effect on state power; any state goal can be a "federally cogni-
zable benefit." Indeed, it is hard to see why, contrary to Regan's con-
demnation of it, a protectionist tariff could not be legitimately
defended on the ground that the protection of domestic industry is
important to the state-that the protection of domestic industry is a
federally cognizable benefit because the state "says it is." In short,
once one allows states to define what are legitimate grounds for regu-
91 Regan, supra note 10, at 1118; see also Collins, supra note 4, at 64 (disguishing
"market efficiency" from "interstate commercial harmony").
92 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1118 ("From the point of view of the nation as a
whole, such a bare transfer of welfare between similarly situated parties in different
states creates no benefit at all.").
93 See id. at 1102-03; see also Am. Can Co. v. Or. Liquor Control Comm'n, 517
P.2d 691, 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (upholding Oregon's bottle bill as valid legislation
under the Commerce Clause).
94 Regan, supra note 10, at 1118.
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lating interstate commerce, there is no principled way to distinguish a
law prescribing maximum hours for bakers from a tariff on flour pro-
duced out-of-state.
More fundamentally, it is simply impossible to distinguish on eco-
nomic grounds inefficiency caused by trade-inhibiting measures from
that caused by other types of regulatory or tax measures, such as a
minimum wage law or environmental regulation. Both types of mea-
sures impose social dead-weight losses that can be monetized. Moreo-
ver, as an economic matter, the latter can be just as or more
burdensome than the former. Consider, for example, a manufacturer
of plastic widgets located in California. Suppose further that Arizona
imposed a one percent tariff on the import of plastic widgets, while
California prohibited the manufacture and sale of plastic widgets.
Both state measures create inefficiency as understood by welfare econ-
omists by depriving would-be consumers and producers of otherwise
desirable market exchanges, yet the California measure, which is not
protectionist, creates far more inefficiency in economic terms and is
more burdensome on the manufacturer than the avowedly protection-
ist Arizona tariff. In short, economic theory does not provide any
basis for treating trade-inhibiting provisions differently as a categori-
cal matter than other regulatory or tax measures. Inefficiency is inef-
ficiency, no matter its cause.
b. Parochialism and Inefficiency
There is another response to the Lochner objection that is more
persuasive. One can acknowledge that inefficiency is inefficiency, but
argue that certain types of legislative deliberations are more likely
than others to enact inefficient measures. This response is grounded
in political process theory: that the Constitution does not disfavor inef-
ficiency as such, but rather those political processes that are not
appropriately attuned to the costs of inefficiency. Stated differently,
the Constitution limits state authority to act in economically ineffi-
cient ways only when the political process cannot be trusted to evalu-
ate the relative benefits and burdens of particular regulatory or tax
measures. On this view, Lochner was wrong because the New York leg-
islature could be trusted to adequately assess the costs and benefits of
the maximum hour law, but, in contrast, it cannot be trusted to evalu-
ate the costs and benefits of a tariff on out-of-state flour. Why not?
Specifically, parochialism may lead to the adoption of unwise or
economically inefficient measures. Recall the candy labeling law from
Part L.A in which the in-state benefits exceeded the in-state costs but
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not the costs nationally.95 A parochially minded state legislature con-
sidering only the impact of the law on its constituents might conclude
that the benefits of such a law outweigh the costs of the measure and
might, therefore, enact the measure, even though the measure's bene-
fits do not outweigh all its costs (that is, it is an economically ineffi-
cient measure). Indeed, at the margin, the state or local
government's refusal to take into account the impact on out-of-state
interests-that is, its parochial deliberations-may be determinative
of whether a particular measure is enacted. On the other hand, were
the state legislature also to consider the impact of the law on out-of-
state interests, it might conclude that the benefits do not outweigh the
costs (which now include those incurred by out-of-state interests) and
might, therefore, refuse to enact the measure. As a consequence, for-
bidding parochialism would promote economic efficiency by prevent-
ing legislatures from underestimating the costs of proposed regulatory
measures.
At the same time, prohibiting parochialism is not equivalent to
promoting unfettered capitalism. Critically, not all economically inef-
ficient measures are the product of parochialism. Indeed, many, if
not most, state regulations and taxes are economically inefficient in
that they disrupt economic exchanges that would make the partici-
pants better off. For example, the maximum hour law for bakers
invalidated in Lochner was undoubtedly inefficient in an economic
sense, but there was no suggestion that the New York legislature was
tainted by parochial concerns. Thus, forbidding parochialism would
not hinder state and local governments from adopting inexpedient or
inefficient measures as such.
As should be apparent, this focus on the problem of parochialism
offers a way out of the Lochner dilemma. The American common mar-
ket does not value interstate trade for some neoclassical capitalist
ideal that unfettered economic activity is always good.96 Rather, our
constitutional commitment to the common market rests on the more
limited, political notion, that state parochialism may infect state politi-
cal processes in undesirable ways, such as by leading to the adoption
of economically ill-advised measures that but for such parochialism
would not have passed. Stated differently, the Constitution's concern
95 See supra Part I.A.
96 See Collins, supra note 4, at 62 ("Describing the national interest as free trade is
misleading because it implies that the doctrine's essential purpose is economic effi-
ciency .... "). As Collins notes, the Framers were not laissez faire capitalists. See id. at
64. Rather, Collins posits that they were interested only in promoting "interstate com-
mercial harmony." Id. at 62. While true, that term does not provide sufficient gui-
dance as to which commercial measures are prohibited and which permitted.
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is not with economic efficiency as such-states are free to prefer other
values at the expense of economic efficiency if they want-but with
state parochialism that encourages the adoption of economically inef-
ficient measures because some of the burdens are borne by out-of-
state interests. 97 Economic inefficiency is merely the tangible price
that the nation pays as a result of such parochialism.
Viewing the American common market as grounded in political,
rather than economic, theory liberates the debate over the dormant
Commerce Clause from the customary free-trade-versus-democratic-
autonomy argument that plagues the discussion of international trad-
ing agreements. 98 The American common market does not limit
democratic decisionmaking, but rather ensures that such decision-
making shows equal regard for all of the interests affected by a mea-
sure. For that reason, even those who reject the notion that the
Constitution commits us to laissez faire capitalism can believe more
limitedly that the Constitution commits us to a common market sys-
tem. Indeed, common markets are not necessarily laissez faire mar-
kets, as the European common market and WTO potently
demonstrate. And, respect for out-of-state interests does not entail a
regulatory race to the laissez faire bottom, in which all commercial
regulations and taxes are constitutionally invalidated.
Finally and most importantly, this understanding of the nature of
the Constitution's commitment to economic efficiency points in favor
of the principle of deliberative equality as the constitutional founda-
tion of the American common market. Deliberative equality encour-
ages free trade by limiting the number of trade-inhibiting measures
that a state is likely to enact. If a state must consider on equal terms
costs borne by in-state and like out-of-state interests, states will have
less leeway to adopt trade-inhibiting measures. There are many mea-
sures whose in-state benefits exceed the in-state costs but not the mea-
sure's total costs. The principle of deliberative equality bars the state
from adopting these measures (at least to the extent the measure's
costs were at all important to the legislature). At the same time,
though, the principle of deliberative equality is faithful to the distinc-
tion between a common market and a free market discussed above.
States remain free to adopt a panoply of commercial regulations and
taxes, all of which interfere in market operations to some extent.
97 Eule, supra note 9, at 428, 444-46; see also Heinzerling, supra note 17, at 252
(discussing relationship between process theory and economic efficiency).
98 For an example of such a criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause, see
McGinley, supra note 18, at 448-50, 455-56.
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Deliberative equality does not replicate Lochner's hostility to regula-
tory interference with free market exchanges.
In sum, deliberative equality bans state and local governments
from acting on parochial animus or indifference to out-of-state inter-
ests. At the same time, however, it respects state regulatory autonomy,
permitting states to adopt trade-inhibiting measures so long as those
measures are not the product of provincialism. More than merely
being an appealing conception of the American common market,
deliberative equality is consistent with the Framers' understanding of
the dangers to federal union posed by state regulation and taxation of
interstate commerce. Moreover, it harmonizes the competing values
of free trade and state regulatory autonomy. As such, it provides the
best normative foundation and understanding of the American com-
mon market.
III. THE VIRTUAL REPRESENTATION MODEL OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
Deliberative equality offers a compelling, balanced, and histori-
cally faithful synthesis of the competing interests of free trade and
state autonomy. Since the New Deal, however, the Court has invoked
two different theoretical models to support its dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence: the virtual representation model and the
antiprotectionism model. This Part discusses the former, while the
next Part addresses the latter.
According to the virtual representation model, the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibits states and local governments from adopt-
ing regulations and taxes that burden out-of-state (and therefore
politically unrepresented) individuals. 99 As Mark Tushnet, a propo-
nent of this model, has explained, the virtual representation theory
"can be viewed as a political application of the economists' theory of
externalities: because a legislative body may underestimate the bur-
dens that its proposals place on people who do not participate in its
99 See Eule, supra note 9, at 442; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 125, 128; see alsoJames
M. O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395, 409, 418
(1982) (noting that "the decision-making process should take into account the inter-
ests of all persons significantly affected by the [state's] decision" and urging dormant
Commerce Clause review when such complete participation does not take place).
Eule, of course, would locate his process theory in a revitalized Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause, rather than in the dormant Commerce Clause. This differ-
ence is immaterial for present purposes.
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selection, the resulting statutes may be inefficient. Judicial review may
on occasion eliminate those inefficiencies."'100 On this view, rigorous
judicial review of the merits of the legislation is a substitute for the
political participation that outside interests have been denied-a sort
of "virtual representation."101
The origins of the virtual representation model can be traced to
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1938 in South Carolina State High-
way Department v. Barnwell Bros.,102 which upheld against a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge South Carolina's prohibition on semi-
tractor trailers beyond a certain width and weight from using state
highways. Writing for the Court, Justice Stone famously declared that
"when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls princi-
pally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on
legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state."'10 3
In such cases, judicial review of the merits of the legislation serves as a
substitute for the political influence that outside interests might have
had were it not for the fact they were outsiders. On the other hand,
the fact that a regulation or tax's burden falls equally on in-state and
out-of-state interests alike was, according to Stone, "a safeguard
100 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 129 n.14; see also O'Fallon, supra note 99, at 400
(noting that only when "all persons whose interests are implicated significantly by a
decision have had the opportunity to register their preferences through the electoral
process" should courts defer to the legislative process).
101 ELY, supra note 9, at 100-01. For an interesting application of this theory to
the issue of international trade under the WTO, see Peter M. Gerhart & Michael S.
Baron, Understanding National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the WTO, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. RE. 505, 515-30 (2004).
102 303 U.S. 177, 192-93 (1938).
103 Id. at 185 n.2; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 6-5, at 1051 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the Court's rigorous review of discriminatory
measures flows from its appreciation of parochial political accountability of state and
local lawmakers). Conversely, several commentators argue that nondiscriminatory
regulations and taxes do not warrant judicial scrutiny because they burden in-state
and out-of-state interests equally and, therefore, state political processes can be
trusted to accurately weigh the respective costs and benefits of the regulation or tax.
See Eule, supra note 9, at 473; Maltz, supra note 13, at 78. As Julian Eule has argued,
"[a] state legislature is unlikely to burden its own citizenry beyond the degree needed
to achieve the desired benefit." Eule, supra note 9, at 473; see also C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 404 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
Court generally defers to health and safety regulations because 'their burden usually
falls on local economic interests as well as other States' economic interests, thus insur-
ing that a State's own political processes will serve as a check against unduly burden-
some regulations.'" (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444
n.18 (1978))).
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against their abuse," obviating the need for close judicial scrutiny.
104
Ever since Barnwell, the Court has repeatedly invoked this rationale
for scrutinizing state and local commercial regulations and taxes that
impact out-of-state interests.'
0 5
At first glance, this approach undeniably has some surface
appeal-after all, as John Hart Ely observed, we typically trust legisla-
tures to make the right decision for their constituents because they
are accountable to them. 106 If a state were to systematically deny rep-
resentation to a particular group-say, all the women in the state-we
would expect the resulting legislation to be skewed in favor of the
represented interests (in this case, men) and against the unrepre-
sented group (women). For the same reason, the systematic exclusion
of out-of-state interests leads us to suspect that legislation will be
skewed in favor of in-state interests and against out-of-state interests.
For example, states are inclined to impose tariffs on out-of-state goods
because the benefits accrue to politically influential in-state interests
while the costs are ostensibly born by politically powerless out-of-state
interests.
10 7
The virtual representation theory's surface appeal, however, evap-
orates on closer inspection because the model fails to give due regard
to state regulatory autonomy; indeed, the model virtually eliminates it.
To see why, answer the following question: what can a state govern-
ment do to avoid the rigorous judicial scrutiny that this model justi-
fies? A state that does not wish to have all of its legislation scrutinized
for gender bias can extend the franchise to women, 108 and, once it
has done so, there is no need for the judiciary to serve as the "virtual
104 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187.
105 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994); S.-Cent. Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery,
449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981); Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 444 n.18; S. Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Min-
ing Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 n.2 (1940).
106 ELY, supra note 9, at 83-84. In fact, John Hart Ely drew upon Stone's theory to
create his famous, representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review. See id. at
75-77. Of course, as Donald Regan has observed, one need not subscribe entirely to
Ely's theory, which has come under attack, to believe that the dormant Commerce
Clause might constitute a particular, more limited instance in which such process
review is justified. See Regan, supra note 10, at 1161.
107 See Eule, supra note 9, at 445-46; Farber & Hudec, supra note 13, at 1404-05;
Heinzerling, supra note 17, at 251-52; Regan, supra note 10, at 1161.
108 Of course, women today have the franchise as a matter of constitutional right.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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representative" of women's interests. 10 9 But that same response can-
not be adopted with regard to out-of-state interests. States cannot
extend the franchise to all out-of-state interests; to do so would elimi-
nate state governments as separate, sovereign entities and be com-
pletely unworkable in practice. 110 Consequently, judicial scrutiny to
compensate for the electoral exclusion of out-of-state interests is per-
petual and universal under this theory.
Proponents of the virtual representation model, such as Mark
Tushnet and Julian Eule, have an answer to this objection. In their
view, the courts' duty of virtual representation arises-that is, judicial
scrutiny is triggered-only when out-of-state interests are disproportion-
ately affected by a state measure. 1I I In contrast, when a measure's bur-
dens fall equally on in-state and out-of-state interests, rigorous judicial
review of the merits of the legislation is unnecessary because, in their
view, the state political process can be trusted to evaluate the merits of
the legislation accurately. Critically, their trust in the political process
is based on the notion that, when in-state individuals are equally
affected, the in-state interests serve as surrogate representatives for
excluded out-of-state individuals, obviating the need for compensatory
judicial review on behalf of the latter.
It is the premise of this limitation-that in-state individuals can
serve as surrogate representatives for out-of-state individuals-that is
the fatal flaw in this more limited variant of the virtual representation
109 For an ironic example of such reluctance on the part of the judiciary to play
that role once women received the franchise, see Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525, 553 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage law for women), overruled by W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
110 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 80; Regan, supra note 10, at 1164-65. Since a state
could never predict ex ante what outside interests might be adversely affected by
future legislation by it or its local governments, the only way to avoid strict scrutiny of
its measures would be to extend the franchise to all voting-age U.S. citizens, trans-
forming each state legislature into a mini-Congress.
111 See Eule, supra note 9, at 460-61; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 135. Interestingly,
this limitation was first suggested by the Court in Barnwell. See S.C. Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938) (noting that judicial scrutiny is applica-
ble only to those measures whose burdens fell "principally" on out-of-state interests).
In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court dispensed with this limitation on
the theory. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945) ("[T]he
Court has often recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls
on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those
political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected.");
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 n.2 (1940) ("[To the
extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the state, it is not likely to
be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation
where it affects adversely interests within the state.").
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model. The whole notion of surrogate representation has a check-
ered past. Prior to the Revolutionary War, Britain justified the lack of
parliamentary representation for the American colonists on the
ground that British subjects at home adequately represented the colo-
nists' interests.' 12 Similarly, in the nineteenth century, opponents of
women's suffrage argued that enfranchised men adequately repre-
sented the interests of the disenfranchised women.' 13 In light of these
historical events, the suggestion that the denial of political representa-
tion can be remedied by providing a surrogate bears a heavy burden
of persuasion.
On the face of it, the idea that in-state individuals can serve as
adequate surrogates for out-of-state individuals is as implausible as the
suggestion that British subjects were adequate surrogates for Ameri-
can colonists or that men were adequate surrogates for women. In
the latter instances, there were obvious and substantial conflicts of
interest between the enfranchised and disenfranchised groups that
negated the notion that the former was an adequate surrogate for the
latter. 1 4 The same problem exists with regard to the surrogate repre-
sentation of out-of-state interests by in-state interests. In-state busi-
nesses are often competitors of the out-of-state businesses that they
supposedly represent. That competitive relationship destroys
whatever coherence of interest one might theoretically suppose to
exist. For example, in-state businesses might not oppose a burden-
some measure, believing that their out-of-state competitors will be
comparatively harmed more by the measure, thereby improving the
in-state businesses' competitive position."t 5 Or the state may buy off
in-state businesses with subsidies or promises of future assistance or
regulatory relief.
1 16
112 TRIBE, supra note 103, § 6-5, at 1055 n.23; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 173 (1969).
113 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3035 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Henderson) ("[The ballot] is not given to the woman, because it is not needed for
her security. Her interests are best protected by father, husband, and brother."); see
also Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and
the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981-87 (2002) (discussing how men were viewed as
the head of the household and governed the other members of the family).
114 See WooD, supra note 112, at 173-81; Siegel, supra note 113, at 991-92.
115 Cf Heinzerling, supra note 17, at 254-55 (noting that in-state consumers may
have different interests than out-of-state consumers and therefore cannot serve as
effective surrogates).
116 Tushnet, supra note 9, at 137; see also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429, 447 (1975) (noting that exemptions were likely the product of political com-
promise to alleviate the statute's burden on local industry).
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Indeed, in-state interests often seek statutory exemptions or other
forms of legislative relief to alleviate the costs of regulations imposed
on them and their out-of-state competitors. A telling and potent
example of such an effort took place in West Lynn Creamery v. Healy.
117
There, the State of Massachusetts imposed a milk tax on all milk, but,
to mollify in-state dairies, the proceeds of the tax were used to subsi-
dize in-state dairies. 118 As the Court expressly noted in invalidating
the measure, the subsidy provision ensured that in-state dairies had no
incentive to fight the tax, which therefore fell exclusively in practice
on out-of-state dairies. 119 In short, the competitive relationship
between the in-state dairies and the out-of-state dairies negated the
possibility that the former were adequate surrogates for the latter.
To be sure, one might try to address the foregoing conflict-of-
interest problem by eschewing reliance on in-state competitors and
instead attempting to identify other potential in-state surrogates
whose interests are sufficiently aligned with the out-of-state interests.
The difficulties with this approach, however, are illuminated by Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 120 in which the Supreme Court tried
such a move. At issue was Minnesota's ban on the sale of milk in non-
returnable, non-refillable plastic containers. 121 The law burdened
plastic resin manufactures, which were all out-of-state-in other
words, there were no in-state plastic resin manufacturers to serve as
surrogates for the out-of-state companies. 122 The Court nevertheless
noted that among the companies challenging the law were several
Minnesota dairies that used plastic containers, a Minnesota company
that used the resin to produce plastic milk jugs, and a Minnesota milk
retailer. 123 The Court surmised that these in-state companies were
suitable surrogates for the out-of-state resin manufactures.
24
Contrary to the Court's suppositions, however, none of the identi-
fied surrogates were adequate substitutes for the out-of-state manufac-
turers. As for the in-state dairies, even the Court itself noted that the
law's impact on the dairies was "slight" because they could simply
switch to paper containers, 125 and the same must have been true for
the milk retailer. The in-state container producer seemed a better
117 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
118 See id. at 191.
119 Id. at 200.
120 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
121 Id. at 458.
122 See id. at 473.
123 Id. at 458 n.1.
124 See id. at 473 n.17.
125 Id. at 472.
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potential fit, but the Court made no attempt to ascertain whether its
interests in fact aligned with those of the out-of-state resin manufac-
turers. It is equally possible that the jug manufacturer also produced
paper jugs, could easily retool to produce such containers, or was pre-
pared to focus its sales efforts in other states, in which case its interests
would differ from those of the out-of-state resin manufactures.
126
True, the mere fact that these Minnesota companies had filed suit
against the statute indicated their opposition to the statute, but it
seems more significant that the out-of-state resin manufactures also
joined the suit, suggesting that the manufactures did not view the
Minnesota companies as sufficient surrogates even to prosecute the
suit, let alone "represent" them before the legislature. In short, even
if they share some general opposition to a given law, different compa-
nies in different lines of business almost invariably possess different
interests that negate the possibility of surrogate representation.
More importantly, even if in-state interests could serve as suitable
surrogates for out-of-state interests as a practical matter, the denial of
actual representation for the latter would still be problematic in prin-
ciple. If one believes that individuals should have the right to influ-
ence governmental decisions through representatives of their own
choosing-which is the underlying premise of this theory-it makes
no sense to say that such a right evaporates when there are substantial
numbers of in-state individuals who can serve as surrogates for the
excluded individuals. 127 It would have been no answer to the Ameri-
can colonists' demands for representation that many British subjects
also objected to the Stamp Act, nor would it have been at all respon-
sive to women's demands for suffrage to say that many men cared
about the plight of women.
Lastly on this point, the surrogate representation response
ignores entirely the fact that politics is all about numbers-specifi-
cally, the number of votes a legislator is likely to win or lose by sup-
porting a given policy. Even if there are numerous in-state individuals
whose interests are perfectly aligned with out-of-state groups and who
vigorously oppose a given measure, the disenfranchisement of out-of-
state interests still warps the legislative process to the disadvantage of
the out-of-state interests. When the number of in-state supporters and
126 This last possibility seems the most likely, as the container manufacturer sold
jugs to out-of-state dairies and most of its sales remained unaffected by the law. See
Brief for Respondents at 28, Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (No. 79-117), 1980 WL
339367; see also TRIBE, supra note 103, § 6-5, at 1055 n.23 (discussing likelihood that
in-state jug manufacturer's interests differed from resin manufacturer's).
127 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1162-63 (noting that Carolene Products theory
requires consideration of all foreigners harmed in non-trivial manner by state law).
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opponents is roughly even, the exclusion of out-of-state groups is
likely to be determinative of the passage of the contested measure.
With out-of-state interests excluded, the measure may pass, but, if they
were included, they might tip the political balance and induce legisla-
tors to vote against the measure. James O'Fallon has put the point
more generally: "The presence of adversely affected constituents, even
in significant numbers, by no means assures that the balance of inter-
ests represented accurately reflects the balance of interests in the
nation as a whole." 12 8
For these reasons, the virtual representation model leaves courts
with no option but to scrutinize each and every state and local law that
impacts out-of-state individuals, but that leads to the second major
problem with this theory: the theory does not provide meaningful gui-
dance to courts regarding what to look for or what type of doctrinal
rules to deploy.129 The theory correctly points out that the exclusion
of out-of-state interests is likely to skew the legislative process in favor
of in-state interests, but, beyond that useful (and correct) insight, it
leaves courts with no framework for determining which laws should be
invalidated and which upheld. The most obvious doctrinal rule sug-
gested by the theory-that state measures that adversely affect unrep-
resented interests are per se invalid-is a non-starter. Every state
commercial measure adversely affects some unrepresented out-of-state
interests. Consequently, such a per se rule would leave state and local
governments powerless to adopt any commercial regulations or
taxes. 
130
One could weaken the rule to a presumption-state measures
that adversely affect unrepresented interests are presumed invalid-
but that opens up another can of worms: how strong is the presump-
tion and what must a state show to rebut the presumption? Theoreti-
cally, one might answer that those measures that would have been
enacted despite the exclusion of out-of-state interests are valid, but
that requires courts to engage in the difficult, counterfactual determi-
nation whether a particular measure would have been adopted had
out-of-state interests been provided political representation. Even the
simplest, quantitative approach-asking how many out-of-state indi-
128 O'Fallon, supra note 99, at 413. Thus, in contrast to Etle and Tushnet,
O'Fallon believes that "all" affected persons are entitled to a participatory role. Id. at
401.
129 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54, 56-57 (1997) (describing how every constitutional value must be imple-
mented through a doctrinal rule of some sort).
130 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1163-64 (rejecting virtual representation theory
because it would lead to invalidation of too many state and local measures).
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viduals are adversely affected by the measure, adding them to the
number of in-state opponents, and then comparing that figure to the
number of in-state supporters of the measure-is utterly unworkable.
There is no way for courts to calculate those numbers, and, even if
they could, it would still be necessary for the courts to determine
whether, in light of those numbers, the legislature (or, even more dif-
ficult, individual legislators) would have voted differently-a task of
mind-boggling complexity.
Instead, proponents of the virtual representation theory typically
urge the courts to balance the measures' burdens and benefits as
called for by the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.13 1 Yet,
this approach, though workable, is untethered to the theory of virtual
representation. The virtual representation model rests upon the
desire to ensure majoritarian democracy-in this context, to ensure
that states may not burden thousands of unrepresented out-of-state
individuals simply for the benefit of a fewer number of in-state citi-
zens. The Pike balancing test, however, focuses exclusively on whether
the measure's burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive"
when compared to the measure's local benefits. 132 As a consequence,
deploying the Pike rule will not necessarily root out instances of
minoritarian tyranny that the virtual representation model abhors.
To see why, consider a proposed state measure that would burden
1,000 out-of-state residents by $1 each. The measure, though, will
generate a benefit for two in-state citizens of $100,000 each. This
would be a classic example of the tyranny of the minority that the
theory of virtual representation condemns-two politically influential
in-state individuals burdening numerous unrepresented out-of-state
individuals-yet, the measure, whose benefits exceed its costs, survives
Pike review.
Conversely, the Pike rule will condemn measures that do not
offend the theory of virtual representation. Consider a state measure
that burdens greatly two out-of-state individuals to the tune of, say,
$500,000 each, but benefits 10,000 in-state citizens in a modest way,
say, $5 each. The Pike test condemns this measure, 133 even though
the measure clearly satisfies the majoritarian concern underlying the
131 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Eule, supra note 9, at 469-74 (proposing
balancing inquiry when measure disproportionately affects out-of-state interests);
O'Fallon, supra note 99, at 413; Tushnet, supra note 9, at 142.
132 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
133 Cf. id. at 140, 145 (invalidating Arizona cantaloupe packaging requirement
that would cost one out-of-state grower $200,000, even though all Arizona cantaloupe
growers would be modestly benefited by the requirement).
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theory of virtual representation. 134 From the vantage point of the the-
ory of virtual representation, the Pike rule is fatally over- and under-
inclusive. The rule may serve to implement other theoretical models,
but virtual representation is not among them.
In sum, the theory of virtual representation does not provide a
superior normative foundation for the American common market.
Although it promotes free interstate trade, it unduly limits state legis-
lative autonomy. To avoid the intrusive judicial review mandated by
this theory, states would have to open up the franchise to out-of-state
individuals. Since no state would do such a thing, the theory there-
fore mandates intrusive Lochner-style judicial review of each and every
state commercial regulation and tax. Worse still, the theory offers no
workable guidance to courts on how to perform such review. In short,
virtual representation is too demanding in principle and too unwork-
able in practice to provide the normative foundation for the American
common market.
IV. THE ANTIPROTECTIONISM MODEL OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE
The other theoretical model deployed by the U.S. Supreme
Court is the antiprotectionism model, according to which the dor-
mant Commerce Clause prohibits state and local governments from
adopting regulations or taxes that are intended to benefit in-state
interests at the expense of out-of-state competitors. Thus, for exam-
ple, taxes and regulations adopted so as to shield in-state industries
from out-of-state competition, such as tariffs on out-of-state producers'
goods, are unconstitutional. 135 Rooting out economic protectionism,
however, is the sole goal and function of the antiprotectionism model.
In the absence of such protectionist intent, state and local commercial
regulations and taxes are constitutional regardless of the severity of
134 One could harmonize the result in Pike with the theory of virtual representa-
tion by abolishing the one person, one vote principle and substituting a one dollar,
one vote principle. On this view, the California cantaloupe grower is entitled to
greater political influence than all the Arizona growers because he suffers more in
dollar terms than all of them gain. No one to my knowledge, however, has ever pro-
posed such a plutocratic conception of the theory of virtual representation.
135 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) ("The para-
digmatic example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce is the protec-
tive tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does
not tax similar products produced in State.").
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their impact on interstate trade and regardless whether parochialism
corrupted the legislative deliberations.
136
The antiprotectionism model has a long, historical pedigree.
Even before the New Deal, -several Supreme Court decisions invali-
dated state and local laws on the ground that the measures were
adopted so as to favor local businesses at the expense of out-of-state
competitors. 137 Although the New Deal wrought a substantial change
in the Court's approach to the Commerce Clause, the Court's antipa-
thy to protectionist measures was not affected. 38 Indeed, it became
more acute, with the Court expressly linking the Commerce Clause to
the role of eliminating state protectionism. For example, in H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,139 which invalidated New York's attempt
to insulate its dairy industry from out-of-state competition, Justice
Jackson decried state efforts to protect local industries, explicitly
observing that the dormant Commerce Clause served to prevent the
adoption of such measures. 140 As Jackson categorically put it,
[O]ur system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.
14 1
136 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1092, 1100.
137 See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1876) (invalidating a Mis-
souri statute that required traveling salesmen who sold out-of-state goods (but not
salesmen who sold in-state goods) to procure a license); see also Voight v. Wright, 141
U.S. 62, 66 (1891) (invalidating a Virginia law requiring inspection only of out-of-state
flour); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497-98 (1887) (invalidat-
ing Tennessee privilege tax applied to salesmen of out-of-state goods); Walling v.
Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 458 (1886) (invaliding Michigan tax on out-of-state salesmen
selling liquor that was manufactured out-of-state); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344,
350 (1881) (invalidating similar Virginia license tax on vendors of out-of-state goods);
Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123, 127 (1880) (suggesting that Texas occupation tax on
liquor vendors that exempts vendors of in-state wine and beer is discriminatory and
therefore violates dormant Commerce Clause); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443
(1880) (invalidating discriminatory wharfage fee on ships unloading out-of-state
goods); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573 (1878) (invalidating auctioneer tax
levied on sale of foreign goods); Morrill v. Wisconsin, 154 U.S. 626, 626 (1877) (inval-
idating similar Wisconsin license tax on peddlers of out-of-state goods).
138 See Williams, supra note 1, at 1908.
139 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
140 See id. at 533-35 (noting that aversion to discrimination was "deeply rooted in
both our history and our law"); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527
(1935) ("Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of
destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against com-
petition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents.").
141 H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 539.
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In the decades following the New Deal, the Court has continued
to view the role of the dormant Commerce Clause in this light. As the
Court succinctly put it in one case, the dormant Commerce Clause
"prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-
state competitors."'
1 42
The antiprotectionism model obviously has a good deal of
appeal. After all, there are few serious supporters of interstate protec-
tionism, at least outside state and local legislatures. The flaw in the
antiprotectionism model, however, involves not what measures it con-
demns but rather what measures it upholds. Unlike deliberative
equality, which invalidates nonprotectionist but parochial measures,
the antiprotectionism model validates all state and local regulations
and taxes that are not protectionist. It is this refusal to address the
dangers posed by nonprotectionist measures that renders the antipro-
tectionism model a normatively unattractive foundation for the dor-
142 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); see also Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588 (1997) ("Protection-
ism, whether targeted at for-profit entities or serving, as here, to encourage
nonprofits to keep their efforts close to home, is forbidden under the dormant Com-
merce Clause."); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) ("In its negative
aspect, the Commerce Clause 'prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors."' (quoting Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647
(1994))); W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) ("'This "nega-
tive" aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that is, regu-
latory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-
state competitors."' (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74)); id. at 205 ("Preser-
vation of local industry by protecting it from the rigors of interstate competition is the
hallmark of the economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause prohibits."); C &
A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) ("The central ratio-
nale for the rule against discrimination is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose
object is local economic protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent."); Or. Waste Sys. v.
Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 106 (1994) ("[R]egulating interstate commerce
in such a way as to give those who handle domestic articles of commerce a cost advan-
tage over their competitors handling similar items produced elsewhere constitutes
such protectionism."); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) ("'This "neg-
ative" aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism-that is, reg-
ulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-
state competitors.'" (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273-74)); New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339 (1982) ("[S]tate-imposed burdens
cannot be squared with the Commerce Clause when they serve only 'simple economic
protectionism.'" (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978))).
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mant Commerce Clause. Stated differently, the antiprotectionism
model underprotects the American common market.
As an initial matter, antiprotectionism's refusal to condemn paro-
chial but nonprotectionist regulations and taxes is at odds with the
historical record regarding the Framers' understanding of the Com-
merce Clause. As noted above, there is little evidence regarding what
type of state measures the Framers thought were prohibited by the
Commerce Clause. At the Constitutional Convention, there were only
six instances in which delegates discussed the matter in any detail. 143
Protectionist measures, such as import tariffs, were certainly men-
tioned,144 but so too were other, nonprotectionist measures, such as
tariffs on in-transit goods and navigation tributes. 145 Likewise, during
the ratification debates, there was scant mention of the subject, but
what little discussion there was pointed to a broader concern than
merely with protectionism. Recall thatJames Madison in the Federalist
warned that the Commerce Clause would prevent seaboard states
from taxing goods in transit between inland states and other states or
foreign nations. 146 Madison's concern was not solely that the sea-
board states would levy the taxes so as to bolster their own domestic
industry-the seaboard states might not have a domestic industry pro-
ducing the taxed good-but also that the seaboard states would levy
the transit taxes simply to generate revenue at the expense of other,
noncompeting producers and consumers in the inland states.1 4 7 In
short, while the historical record is far from conclusive, the Framers
expressed concern about parochial state taxes that would not qualify
as protectionist and, therefore, would survive constitutional review
under the antiprotectionism model.
More importantly, though, the antiprotectionism model under-
values the interests in interstate trade by ignoring the dangers to inter-
state commerce posed by parochial but non-protectionist regulations
and taxes. Recall that free interstate trade is valuable because it pro-
motes political union, discourages interstate trade wars, and fosters
143 See Abel, supra note 47, at 470-71.
144 Madison, August 21 Notes, in 2 The RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 54, at 360-61 (export duties); Madison, August 28 Notes, in 2 The
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 54, at 437, 441 (import
duties).
145 See, e.g., James McHenry, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 4,
1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENION OF 1787, supra note 54, at 503,
503-04.
146 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 268; see supra text
accompanying note 57.
147 See The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 267-68.
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economic growth. 148 Nonprotectionist but parochial regulations and
taxes seriously undermine all three constitutional values. To see how,
consider a hypothetical ban adopted by State A on the sale of avoca-
dos that contain less than eight percent oil content.1 49 Suppose that
State A has no avocado growers nor any in-state industry that would
benefit from the exclusion of avocados from the domestic market (in
other words, the measure is not protectionist as understood by the
antiprotectionism model). Suppose further that other states use a dif-
ferent, more lenient oil standard, say a six percent minimum avocado
oil content requirement. In short, State A has adopted a regulation
that varies in substantive content from that of other states-a circum-
stance that is common in the United States with respect to matters
other than avocados. This is the problem of trade harmonization, and
it is a real problem that costs interstate businesses substantial sums
every year.' 50
Now suppose that State A had no particularly good reason for
adopting its eight percent standard and that, despite the enormous
costs the regulation would impose on out-of-state avocado growers,
the state legislature simply ignored those costs because they were born
by out-of-state interests (i.e., suppose that it is a parochial measure
that violates deliberative equality). Under these circumstances, the
eight percent standard interferes with interstate commerce in ways
that undermine political union, encourage interstate trade rivalries,
and retards economic growth. Other states with avocado growers will
certainly be upset that State A imposed such costs on their avocado
growers without giving any consideration to the burdens imposed on
the growers, and these other states may seek to find a way to retaliate
against industries located in State A. Likewise, by suppressing the
trade in six percent avocados, State A has generated social welfare
losses by preventing voluntary market exchanges that would otherwise
take place absent the regulation. In short, nonprotectionist parochial
measures of this sort pose a substantial threat to interstate trade and
the underlying constitutional values that it promotes.
148 See supra Part II.B.
149 Cf Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133, 133-34
(1963) (describing California's ban on selling avocados with less than eight percent
oil content).
150 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning Multijurisdictional Tax
Competition, in REc.uLATORv COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 49, 59 (Daniel
C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) (discussing the compliance costs for nation-
wide businesses in the area of state taxes); see also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
772, 775-76 (1945) (invalidating Arizona train limit statute on this ground).
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These defects in the antiprotectionism model have not been lost
on the Supreme Court, which-despite its professed embrace of the
model-has never strictly limited itself solely to invalidating protec-
tionist measures. Rather, the Court has invalidated nonprotectionist
measures that have imposed substantial costs on interstate commerce
without significant countervailing benefits to the enacting state-mea-
sures that can only be understood as parochial in nature. A classic
example is Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,15 1 in which the Court inval-
idated Illinois' requirement that semi-tractor trailer trucks using Illi-
nois highways be equipped with curved mudflaps.152 Not only did
most other states permit the use of straight mudflaps, Arkansas affirm-
atively required them. 153 As a consequence, the Illinois measure
imposed substantial costs on out-of-state interstate truckers, who
would be forced to change their mudflaps at the Illinois border. 154 At
the same time, the Court found that curved mudflaps were no safer
than straight mudflaps and potentially less safe in some circum-
stances.1 55 Even though the measure was not protectionist-there was
no evidence that Illinois had enacted the measure to benefit an Illi-
nois-based company or industry-the Court nevertheless invalidated
the measure as unduly burdening interstate commerce. 156 There are
other examples. 15 7 In short, even the Court has implicitly acknowl-
edged the limitations of the antiprotectionism model and refused to
adhere to a strict requirement that nonprotectionist measures be
upheld.
In response, proponents of the antiprotectionism model acknowl-
edge that nonprotectionist measures can be burdensome but argue
that there is no way to determine when interstate trade has been
unduly burdened. In their view, a proper respect for state sovereignty
therefore entitles states to adopt taxes and regulations of their own
151 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
152 Id.
153 See id. at 523.
154 See id. at 527-28; see also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Jim's Motorcycle, Inc., 401
F.3d 560, 573 (4th Cir. 2005) (invalidating on Pike grounds a Virginia law that pre-
cluded establishment of new motor vehicle franchises whenever an existing fran-
chisee filed protest).
155 Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. at 525 (noting that curved flap decreased brake
effectiveness).
156 See id. at 527-28.
157 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982); Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447-48 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142-46 (1970); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771-72, 774-75 (1945).
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choosing regardless of the measures' impact on interstate
commerce.
158
This is a potent response, but it is first necessary to clarify exactly
what the proponents mean by it. They cannot be claiming that the
Constitution entitles states to enact nonprotectionist measures as a
matter of state autonomy. As part of its affirmative power over com-
merce, Congress can undoubtedly preempt state measures that are
not protectionist in nature, as it often does in imposing a uniform rule
of trade that preempts state rules in particular areas.1 59 In fact, even
the staunchest proponents of the antiprotectionist model support
Congress's power to do so. 1 60 Rather, the proponents' point must be
that the judiciary does not have the ability to enforce constitutional
limits on state authority beyond eliminating protectionist regulations
and taxes. Stated differently, for its proponents, the antiprotection-
ism model is the only constitutional model that the judiciary can apply
in a principled matter; attempts to go beyond antiprotectionism
embroil the judiciary in making judgments beyond its capabilities.
Among the current Justices of the Court, Justice Scalia has most
often made this claim, contending that the test from Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.-which the Court uses to root out unduly burdensome
regulations and which focuses on whether a state regulation's burden
on interstate commerce is grossly excessive in comparison to the mea-
sure's local benefits' 61-improperly requires courts to balance incom-
mensurable values. As he has put it, comparing benefits and burdens
is akin to 'judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular
rock is heavy."
1 62
As an initial matter, the attacks on the Court's efforts to identify
unduly burdensome regulations, such as through the Pike balancing
test, seem vastly overblown. Policymaking often (and, according to
some, should always) involves the comparison of costs and benefits,
most of which can be monetized. In fact, by executive order, every
President from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has required fed-
158 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1177.
159 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521, 7543 (2000) (prescribing uniform motor vehicle
emission standards and preempting state standards except in limited circumstances).
160 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1175-76; see also Redish & Nugent, supra note 18,
at 598 (arguing that Congress can preempt state law when uniformity is required).
161 See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 441-44 (applying the Pike test to
conclude that "the challenged regulations unconstitutionally burden interstate
commerce").
162 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (ScaliaJ.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507
U.S. 60, 79-80 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing Pike balancing test as too indeterminate).
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eral agencies to weigh the costs and benefits of proposed regulatory
actions.1 63 Moreover, when legislatures or executive officials do so
(and they often do so), there is no particular reason why courts can-
not review the political branches' analysis. Indeed, with respect to
federal agencies, courts often do so without any objection to the prac-
tice on this ground. 164 In light of these unquestioned practices by the
federal courts, it seems hard to believe that the Pike balancing test has
embroiled the Court in tasks for which it is unprepared or institution-
ally ill-suited.
More importantly, though, the Pike balancing test is not the sole
formula to protect interstate trade against unduly burdensome state
regulations; indeed, it may not even be the best one. In contrast to
the Pike test, deliberative equality does not require the judiciary to
balance costs and benefits or make any judgment as to whether the
former are "grossly excessive" when compared to the latter. Rather,
deliberative equality demands only that courts assess whether the leg-
islature's balancing of those factors reflects some parochial disregard
of out-of-state interests. The inquiry centers not on the quantum of
costs and their relationship to the measure's benefits, but rather on
how the legislature assessed those costs. To put it in Justice Scalia's
terms, deliberative equality does not require courts to determine
whether a line is longer than a pile of rocks is heavy but rather to
assess whether the legislature undervalued the weight of the pile
because it refused to weigh the rocks that came from out-of-state.
Like all judicial formulae that focus on the legislature's delibera-
tions,1 65 that inquiry is well within the judiciary's ability to perform
and does not involve the Court in balancing incommensurable values.
Thus, whatever may be said about the Pike balancing test, deliberative
equality provides a judicially workable and principled means for
assessing the validity of nonprotectionist measures. Stated differently,
antiprotectionism does not exhaust the capabilities of the federal judi-
ciary as its proponents presuppose.
In a last, rear-guard defense of the antiprotectionism model,
Donald Regan concedes the need to supplement the model but only
in the context of regulations involving transportation or taxes on
interstate commerce. 166 In all other cases-specifically, cases involv-
163 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
164 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 42-43 (1983) (engaging in hard look review of agency policy decisions).
165 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976) (requiring, to estab-
lish an equal protection violation, evidence that legislature intended to classify along
racial lines).
166 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1104-05, 1182-85.
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ing the regulation of the trade in goods and services-Regan con-
tends that antiprotectionism is all the courts should be doing. 167 Yet,
the very reasons that Regan proffers as justification for this limitation
point toward a more expansive conception of the dormant Commerce
Clause than that provided by the antiprotectionism model. For exam-
ple, Regan contends that burdensome but non-protectionist transpor-
tation regulations appropriately raise constitutional concerns because
there is "a national interest in the existence of an effective transporta-
tion network linking the states" and because such a network is "essen-
tial to genuine political union."'168 But the same can be said for
interstate trade generally. Trade in goods and services is necessary to
promote national political integration; indeed, interstate transporta-
tion is presumably important because it fosters such trade in goods
and services. Likewise, it is equally true that one state's burdensome
regulations or taxes can adversely impact other states' trade as much
as transportation restrictions; were one state to adopt the hypothetical
avocado law discussed above, the impact of such a measure would
surely be felt in other states too. In short, the need to protect inter-
state commerce from non-protectionist but parochial regulations and
taxes is not limited to any particular areas of interstate commerce but
applies across the board to all facets of it.
In sum, the principle of deliberative equality provides the best
normative justification for the American common market. It is most
faithful to the vision of the Commerce Clause articulated by the Fram-
ers, and it promotes political union, suppresses interstate trade ani-
mus that may give rise to retaliatory actions, and fosters economic
efficiency. Yet, at the same time, deliberative equality still provides
ample room for states to adopt their own regulatory and tax policies.
In contrast, the virtual representation model is too broad, curtailing
state autonomy in undesirable or unworkable ways. The antiprotec-
tionism model, on the other hand, is too narrow, leaving interstate
commerce subject to divergent state regulatory and taxation regimes
that may severely burden such trade.
V. DELIBERATIVE EQUALITY AND SOVEREIGN PROTECTIONISM
This is not the place to elaborate in a comprehensive and
detailed fashion the doctrinal contours of a constitutional regime
167 See id. at 1104-05.
168 Id. at 1184.
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committed to the principle of deliberative equality. That task must
await another day. Nevertheless, it is possible to illustrate how deliber-
ative equality rules out one particular form of state action that the
Court has recently endorsed as consistent with the dormant Com-
merce Clause-namely, that states may enact regulations and taxes
that favor governmental operations at the expense of out-of-state pri-
vate or public competitors.
In the past two years, the Court has embraced an exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause for governmental efforts to protect public
entities from outside competition. In United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a solid-waste flow control ordinance that required all
solid waste be processed at local, municipally owned facilities, 169 and,
in Department of Revenue v. Davis, the Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a state income tax imposed on the interest earned on out-of-state
municipal bonds, even though the interest earned on bonds issued by
the state and its political subdivisions were exempt from taxation.1
70
In both cases, the Court rested its decision on the ground that the
state may enact regulatory or tax measures to protect its own govern-
mental operations or functions from outside competition. 17 1 I call
this form of state action "sovereign protectionism," and, as this sub-
part shows, it is inconsistent with a constitutional regime committed to
deliberative equality.
A. The Decisions
In United Haulers, the Court confronted the constitutionality of
solid waste flow control ordinances adopted by several counties in
New York that required private garbage haulers to deliver all solid
waste collected within the counties to a municipally owned processing
station. In response to a solid waste disposal crisis in the 1980s, the
state legislature created the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Manage-
ment Authority to collect, process, and dispose of all solid waste in the
counties. 172 Thereafter, the Authority assumed responsibility for
processing and disposing solid waste in the counties, although private
waste hauling companies were allowed to continue to collect trash
from county residents and transport it to the Authority's processing
169 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1790-92, 1798 (2007).
170 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804-08 (2008).
171 See id. at 1810; United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
172 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. Law §§ 2049-aa to -yy (McKinney 1995).
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facilities. 173 To offset the cost of operating its processing facilities, the
Authority charged the haulers tipping fees based on the weight and
composition of the solid waste brought to the Authority's facilities.174
These fees were substantially higher than the fees that private proces-
sors typically charged. 175 To ensure that the haulers did not bypass
the Authority's facilities in favor of lower cost, private facilities, the
counties adopted flow-control ordinances that required that all solid
waste generated within the counties be delivered to the Authority's
processing facilities. 176 The practical effect of the flow-control ordi-
nances was to exclude private waste management companies from
processing Oneida and Herkimer solid waste.
From the standpoint of the dormant Commerce Clause, the inva-
lidity of such flow-control ordinances had seemingly been resolved by
the Court thirteen years earlier in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown.177 There, the Court had held that the Town of Clarks-
town's flow-control ordinance, which was almost identical in substance
to the Oneida and Herkimer county ordinances, discriminated against
interstate commerce by excluding out-of-state waste processors from
competing for local waste. 178 The only difference between the Clarks-
town and Oneida/Herkimer ordinances was the fact that the favored
processing facility in the latter counties was municipally owned, a
seemingly immaterial difference.
In United Haulers, however, the Court upheld the Oneida-
Herkimer flow control ordinance. Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice
Roberts did not overrule Carbone but rather distinguished it precisely
on the ground that municipal ownership of the favored facility ren-
dered the counties' flow-control ordinance unproblematic.1 79 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not hold that the counties' ordinances were
immune from constitutional challenge because the counties were act-
ing as market participants; as even the counties conceded, that excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause was inapplicable.18 0 Rather,




177 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
178 Id. at 390.
179 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
180 See Brief for Respondents at 24-25, United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. 1786 (No.
05-1345), 2006 WL 3606273. The flow-control ordinances did not reflect a decision
by the counties regarding with whom to contract or to whom to distribute county-
owned resources; rather, the ordinances were manifestly regulatory in nature, forbid-
ding private parties from taking their trash to other, privately owned, waste manage-
ment facilities for processing. See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1807 (Alito, J.,
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the Court announced that the Oneida and Herkimer flow-control
ordinances did not discriminate against interstate commerce because
the counties were not favoring private in-state businesses but rather
municipally owned solid waste processing facilities. As the Court
tersely put it, "States and municipalities are not private businesses,"
and "it does not make sense to regard laws favoring local government
and laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism."' 8 1 Applying
the lenient test reserved for nondiscriminatory measures, the Court
concluded that any burden on interstate commerce was clearly out-
weighed by the benefits of the measure in ensuring the financial
security of the municipal facilities.'
8 2
While the flow control ordinances at issue in United Haulers
harmed private competitors, the measure at issue in Department of Reve-
nue v. Davis involved a state attempt to benefit itself at the expense of
other state and local governments. The State of Kentucky has a per-
sonal income tax. In defining the income subject to the tax, Kentucky
follows the federal income tax code's definition of income, which
excludes interest earned on bonds issued by states and their political
subdivisions from taxation.'8 3 At the same time, however, Kentucky
expressly subjects to taxation the interest earned on bonds issued by
other states or their municipalities. 184 Kentucky's actions are hardly
unique: of the forty-three states with an income tax, forty-two provide
preferential tax treatment for some or all in-state municipal bonds.
185
In Davis, the Court upheld Kentucky's differential taxation
scheme. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter declared that the result
followed "a fortior" from United Haulers, which he read as distinguish-
dissenting). In contrast to the flow-control ordinances, the counties' decision to con-
tract with private waste companies to remove and dispose of the waste handled at the
municipally owned facility were within the market participant exception. See United
Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438 F.3d 150, 158 (2d
Cir. 2006), affd, 127 S. Ct. 1786. Likewise, had the Authority agreed only to receive
waste from county residents that decision almost certainly would have fit within the
exception. Cf Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812-14 (1976)
(upholding a similar policy to pay bounties only on vehicles processed by in-state
automobile processors).
181 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
182 See id. at 1797. Justice Scalia did not join that portion of the Court's opinion.
See id. at 1799 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part). Justice Alito,joined by Justices Stevens
and Kennedy, dissented. See id. at 1807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
183 See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006); Ky. REX'. STAT. ANN. § 141.010 (8)-(14) (West
2006).
184 Ky. REx,. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2007).
185 See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1807 n.7 (2008). Only Indiana
accords similar tax treatment to out-of-state municipal bonds as they do in-state
bonds. See id.
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ing between state measures that favored governmental operations and
those that favored private enterprises. 186 On that basis, the Kentucky
taxation scheme was not discriminatory because it "favors a traditional
government function without any differential treatment favoring local
entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests.' 87 Treating
the measure as nondiscriminatory, the Court then declared that it was
unable to perform the lenient review required for such measures
because "the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw relia-
ble conclusions of the kind that would be necessary" to determine that
the measure's costs clearly exceed its benefits.' 88 Consequently, the
Kentucky measure was constitutional.
B. The Court's Defense of Sovereign Protectionism
In both cases, the Court offered three distinct reasons why sover-
eign protectionism is consistent with the dormant Commerce Clause.
First, drawing upon the antiprotectionism model, the Court
announced that laws that favor the government, rather than local pri-
vate businesses, are unlikely to be motivated by "simple economic pro-
tectionism" and, therefore, do not deserve searching judicial
scrutiny. 89 Second, the Court noted that the particular favored gov-
186 See id. at 1810.
187 Id. at 1811. Justice Souter, this time joined by only two other Justices, also
concluded that Kentucky's differential taxation scheme fit within the market partici-
pant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. Id.; see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding a South Dakota policy to sell cement from state-
owned plant only to in-state residents under the market participant exception). For
reasons that I detail at length elsewhere, I find the plurality's reliance on the market
participant exception unavailing. See Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning,
The New Protectionism and the Dormant Commerce Clause 61-68 (2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author). In short, Kentucky is not purchasing or selling
any item; it has not, for example, decided to sell its bonds only to Kentucky citizens, a
policy that might arguably qualify as within the exception. Rather, Kentucky is taxing
bonds sold by other states to Kentucky taxpayers. And, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, the exercise of the power of taxation with respect to a transaction to
which the state is not a party is prototypically the exercise of a sovereign power
outside the market participant exception. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 277 (1988); see also Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause After United Haulers, 115 TAx NoTEs 1037, 1041 (2007) ("Taxation is a
'regulatory' function, not one performed by market participants."). Even the Ohio
Court of Appeals, which upheld Ohio's discriminatory municipal bond tax, agreed
that the market participant exception did not apply. See Shaper v. Tracy, 647 N.E.2d
550, 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
188 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
189 See id. at 1810; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth. 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1796 (2007).
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ernmental operations-waste processing (United Haulers) and munici-
pal financing (Davis)-were "traditionally" or "quintessentially"
public functions and, as such, should be exempt from standard dor-
mant Commerce Clause review.190 Third, invoking the virtual repre-
sentation model, the Court declared that, because local interests also
bear the cost of measures that favor the government, such interests
can be trusted to oppose sovereign protectionism in the political pro-
cess, obviating the need for judicial scrutiny.191
As an initial matter, the Court's opinions in United Haulers and
Davis reveal clearly the Court's inability or refusal to settle on one
theoretical model for the dormant Commerce Clause. Although the
models are theoretically inconsistent and point to divergent rulings in
different circumstances, 92 the Court invoked both of them and
attempted to show how sovereign protectionism is consistent with
both. The Court's continuing theoretical equivocation only serves to
exacerbate rather than lessen the confusion regarding how to adjudi-
cate dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
More to the point, none of the reasons proffered by the Court for
upholding sovereign protectionism withstand scrutiny. Take the
Court's first claim that governmental favoritism is unlikely to be moti-
vated by base protectionism. Even were one to embrace the antipro-
tectionism model as the appropriate theoretical account of the
dormant Commerce Clause, the Court's assertion that the model is
inapplicable because governments typically do not act for protection-
ist reasons is problematic. Governments undoubtedly act differently
than private enterprises, 193 but that is not the issue. Rather, for
antiprotectionists, the question is whether governmental favoritism of
its own operations that compete with other private or public enter-
prises is likely to be the product of protectionist motivations, and, on
this question, there is just as much reason to believe that state or local
governments are likely to act upon protectionist considerations when
the benefited operation is owned by the government as when the ben-
efited operation is privately held. The same political processes that
make it likely for state and local governments to act on parochial
190 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810; United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796.
191 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809-10, 1815-17; United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797.
192 For example, were a county near the state border to adopt a similar flow-con-
trol ordinance favoring its municipally owned processing station-i.e., were the bur-
dens of such sovereign protectionism to fall principally on out-of-state interests-the
antiprotectionist model would bless the ordinance's constitutionality, while the virtual
representation model would condemn it.
193 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (Powell, J., dissenting); Coenen,
supra note 36, at 421-22; Varat, supra note 36, at 506.
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impulses to favor local businesses at the expense of out-of-state com-
petitors likewise encourage state and local governments to favor their
own operations at the expense of out-of-state competitors. As with pri-
vate protectionism, sovereign protectionism benefits local workers
and businesses.' 94 Indeed, the fact that local voters have paid for the
favored government operations through their taxes makes them even
more likely to demand parochial regulations to favor the municipal
facility in order to recoup their municipal investment.
Contrary to the Court's professed faith in the bona fides of gov-
ernment motives, a more faithful application of the antiprotectionist
model would subject state and local favoritism of their operations to
searching judicial scrutiny, not exempt them from it. To be sure, gov-
ernment laws that favor government operations may sometimes be
motivated by reasons other than base parochialism-in United Haulers,
for example, Oneida claimed that the flow control ordinance was
motivated by environmental concernsI 5 but the problem with the
Court's approach is precisely that it exempts such measures from the
scrutiny necessary to ensure that protectionism did not drive the
adoption of the measure.
1 96
Attempting to avoid the consequences of this line of reasoning,
the Court in Davis redefined protectionism to mean only efforts to
shield private enterprise from outside competition. For the Court,
sovereign protectionism does not constitute protectionism, or at least
not the type of protectionism against which the dormant Commerce
Clause is aimed.1 97 Yet, the Court gave no reason for its curious and
restrictive conception of protectionism, and, as a matter of first princi-
ples, there is no obvious reason to treat "public" or "sovereign" protec-
tionism as less opprobrious than "private" protectionism. The same
concerns that animate the Constitution's hostility to protectionism
directed against private entities for the benefit of local companies
apply equally to protectionism directed against out-of-state govern-
ments for the benefit of in-state governments. Such public protection-
ism undermines political union, invites retaliatory conduct from
adversely affected states, and inhibits the efficient allocation of
resources in ways that are unlikely to be corrected by normal state
political processes.
In fact, when directed at another government, sovereign protec-
tionism is actually of greater constitutional concern. When a state
194 See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
195 See id. at 1815-17.
196 See id. at 1809.
197 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008).
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enacts a protectionist measure to benefit in-state private interests at
the expense of out-of-state businesses, the other states are one step
removed from the harm-it is the citizens of the state, not the state
itself, that suffer the injury. 198 When a state enacts a protectionist
measure to benefit itself at the expense of other states, however, the
harm is visited directly upon the other states-there is no private
intermediary. As such, the likelihood of political antagonism and
retaliatory action is heightened. Indeed, the fact that every state but
one with an income tax has followed Kentucky's protectionist
approach to the taxation of municipal bonds1 99 testifies powerfully to
the retaliatory impulse to which sovereign protectionism directed at
another sovereign gives rise. For this reason, the Court is right that
sovereign protectionism is qualitatively different from "the private
protectionism that has driven the development of the dormant Com-
merce Clause," 200 but it draws the wrong conclusion from it. Sover-
eign protectionism is a more, not less, dangerous variant of
protectionism generally.
Nor is there any more force to the Court's second claim that dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny is unnecessary or inappropriate with
respect to the government's performance of traditional governmental
functions. Even if state and local governments have traditionally been
involved in waste processing or bond financing, 20 1 that fact has no
bearing upon the constitutionality of sovereign protectionism. The
issue is not whether local governments may provide such services-
they undoubtedly may-but whether state and local governments can
shield their own operations from out-of-state competition. Once a
state or local government has begun performing functions that com-
pete with other private or public entities, the fact that government has
historically or traditionally performed such functions does not provide
any justification for state or local efforts to insulate such government
operations from out-of-state competition. Protectionism with respect
to traditional government functions is surely just as problematic as
protectionism with respect to nontraditional governmental functions.
198 Of course, the state itself may properly take umbrage at the harm done to its
citizens, and, in fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that states may sue
other states on behalf of their citizens harmed by a protectionist measure. See Wyo-
ming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448 (1992).
199 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
200 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
201 It was certainly not true of Oneida and Herkimer counties, where the counties
became involved only after the waste crisis of the 1980s. See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct.
at 1790-91; see also id. at 1811 (Aito, J., dissenting) (noting that, today, most solid
waste is processed at privately owned facilities).
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To be fair, the Court does not suggest the contrary; rather, the
thrust of its claim seems to be that, regardless of the danger posed by
protectionism with respect to traditional governmental functions,
judicial review to prevent it is even worse. In the Court's view, apply-
ing the dormant Commerce Clause to state efforts to perform their
traditional governmental functions unduly interferes with those func-
tions. 20 2 The Court, however, never explains why that is so, and, on
analysis, the Court's concern seems vastly overblown. Judicial review
under the dormant Commerce Clause is not some wide-ranging, rov-
ing, Lochner-esque process in which courts scrutinize and second-guess
the substantive merits of state and local laws; rather, the required
review is of highly limited scope, which affords ample room to and
respect for state autonomy. Specifically, under the modern dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine, it is only when a law discriminates against
interstate commerce that searching judicial scrutiny is triggered, and
even then the state may validate the measure by demonstrating that
the discriminatory feature of the measure is not the product of protec-
tionist motives.203 Hence, so long as state and local governments do
not enact discriminatory measures for protectionist reasons, they
remain free to discharge their "traditional governmental functions" in
whatever manner they wish.
Moreover, even if the Court's concern was justified, it is far from
clear that the Court's "traditional governmental functions" rule is the
appropriate mechanism to use to protect state autonomy. At one
time, the Court deployed a similar test so as to protect state and local
operations from federal, not private, interference. This was the "inte-
gral governmental functions" rule of National League of Cities v.
Usery.204 The Court, however, subsequently overruled Usery in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,20 5 holding that the "inte-
gral governmental functions" rule was both unworkable in practice
and unsound in principle.20 6 As the Court explained, the line distin-
guishing between integral or traditional governmental functions and
202 See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-11; see also id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) ("To apply the negative Commerce Clause in this area would broaden the doc-
trine 'beyond its existing scope, and intrude on a regulatory sphere traditionally occu-
pied by . . . the States."' (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1798)).
203 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1793.
204 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (holding that Congress' commerce power did not
authorize Congress to regulate the "integral governmental functions" of state and
local governments), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
205 469 U.S. 528.
206 Id. at 546.
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other state governmental functions was "elusive at best."20 7 The Court
was particularly worried that the integral government functions rule
required unelected federal judges to make unprincipled decisions as
to which state functions were sufficiently important to warrant immu-
nity from federal regulation.208 Those same concerns apply with
equal force to the Court's attempt to resurrect Usery in the name of
protecting some state and local governmental functions from search-
ing judicial review under the dormant Commerce Clause. 20 9
Lastly, there is no merit to the Court's third and final argument
from United Haulers that judicial review of sovereign protectionism is
unnecessary because other, in-state interests are also harmed by such
sovereign protectionism. 210 Even if one were to embrace the virtual
representation account of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court's
reasoning is deeply problematic. In United Haulers, for example, the
Court made no attempt to ascertain whether all or even most of the
burdens of the measure fell on in-state interests. Rather, ignoring the
impact of the measure on trash processors, the Court noted only that
"the most palpable harm"-higher trash removal prices-fell on local
residents.2 11
As an initial matter, it seems hard to believe that county residents,
who presumably experienced only modest increases in garbage collec-
tion prices, were harmed more than private waste processors, who pre-
sumably lost millions of dollars in revenue and profits. Yet, even if
that were true, the Court's relative trivialization of the harm suffered
by private waste processors misses the point. The virtual representa-
tion model has never been understood to turn upon whether "the
most palpable harm" was felt locally or extraterritorially. Rather, the
virtual representation model focuses on whether out-of-state interests
have been harmed and, if so (as is almost always the case), whether in-
state interests served as surrogate representatives of the non-
residents. 212 Here, not only did the Court make no effort to deter-
mine whether local residents had served as surrogate representatives
207 Id. at 539.
208 See id. at 545-46.
209 See also United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1810-11 (Alito,J., dissenting) (noting simi-
larity to Usery).
210 See id. at 1797 (majority opinion). In Davis, Kentucky seized on this reasoning,
arguing that the burden of the measure fell "exclusively" on in-state interests. See
Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, Dep't. of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (No. 06-
666), 2007 WL 2115450. Interestingly, however, the Court made no mention of the
incidence of the tax.
211 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797.
212 See Regan, supra note 10, at 1161-62.
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of the waste processors, there was every reason to believe that the
residents hadn't fulfilled that role: because the ordinances' individual
impact on each resident was small-perhaps only an increase of a few
dollars for garbage service-local residents would have little reason to
mobilize against the measure. It was a classic collective action
problem.
2 1 3
Worse, by pointing out that local residents were harmed by the
measure, the Court seemed to suggest that any localized burden
would be sufficient to insulate regulations or taxes from stringentjudi-
cial review.214 Yet, the mere fact that some in-state interests are
harmed by a particular measure is not sufficient to insulate it from
dormant Commerce Clause review. Almost all regulations and taxes
impose some local burdens, usually in the form of higher costs for
local consumers or producers of the regulated or taxed good or ser-
vice.2 1 5 Tariffs on out-of-state goods impose burdens on local consum-
ers, yet they are clearly unconstitutional despite that fact.216 By
suggesting that any local burden would suffice, the Court potentially
insulated every commercial regulation or tax from judicial scrutiny.
In a sense, the Court's desire to limit the impact of the virtual
representation model is understandable. As noted above, 217 one of
the defects in the model is that, because all regulations and taxes
impose some burden on interstate commerce, it requires all state and
local regulations and taxes to be rigorously scrutinized. Yet, United
Haulers goes too far in the opposite extreme by suggesting that the
presence of any local burden insulates the measure from judicial scru-
tiny. While the Court's concerns are entirely understandable, its rem-
edy effectively eliminates judicial review under the dormant
Commerce Clause and, in so doing, reveals clearly the underlying flaw
in the virtual representation model-its inability to delineate which
213 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REx. 713,
724-26 (1985); see also Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 39 (1991) ("Finally, for any given level of per capita
benefit to group members from a legal change, a larger group will likely face a
smaller opposition that is more motivated because it suffers greater per capita costs.
Hence, large groups are not just less effective in their own right; they also generally
face more effective opposition than small groups."); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 892 (1987) ("Political
activity should be dominated by small groups of individuals seeking to benefit them-
selves, usually at the public expense.").
214 See United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797.
215 See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION 6 (1993) ("The capacity of
state and local taxation to burden national markets has long been recognized.").
216 See W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).
217 See supra Part IIl.
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state and local commercial regulations deserve rigorous judicial scru-
tiny and which do not.
C. Deliberative Equality Applied
In contrast to the Court's muddled defense of sovereign protec-
tionism, deliberative equality provides a coherent, normatively supe-
rior way of adjudicating these cases. Rather than focusing dispositively
on whether the favored function or operation is public or private,
deliberative equality focuses the judicial inquiry on whether the state
or local government gave equal regard to both in-state and out-of-state
interests burdened by the particular measure.2 1 8 Some forms of
municipal favoritism may pass that test; some may not. In either case,
it is the measure's burdens rather than its beneficiaries that are the
proper focus of the Court's review. That the measure favors govern-
mental rather than private operations has no formal significance.
Ironically, had the Court applied the deliberative equality model
in United Haulers, it would have reached the same result as there was
no evidence that the counties had weighed the burdens imposed on
out-of-state interests differently than they had in-state interests. The
plaintiffs in the action were six private waste haulers that operated in
the counties and their local trade association. Undoubtedly, the waste
haulers were harmed by the flow control ordinance in that they paid
higher tipping fees than they otherwise would have if they could trans-
port the waste to private waste processing facilities, but the haulers
were all New York based businesses.21 9 There was no evidence, how-
ever, that the flow-control ordinances burdened out-of-state waste
haulers, let alone that the counties had ignored or trivialized the
impact on such businesses in adopting the ordinances.
To be sure, out-of-state private waste processing facilities could
legitimately claim that the flow control ordinances worked to their
disadvantage vis-;t-vis the Authority. It is somewhat telling, however,
that no such facility joined the lawsuit, thereby suggesting that any
harm to out-of-state processors was minimal (or least not substantial
enough to warrant litigation). More importantly, as the Supreme
Court expressly observed, there was no evidence that the flow control
218 See supra Part I.A.
219 See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 438
F.3d 150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2006), affd 127 S. Ct. 352. Indeed, the National Solid
Waste Management Association (NSWMA) moved to intervene in the case precisely
on the ground that the haulers were all local businesses and were therefore, accord-
ing to NSWMA, incapable of representing the interests of out-of-state companies. See
Memorandum of Law at 14, United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., No. 95-CV-0516 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002).
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ordinance worked primarily to the disadvantage of out-of-state waste
processors. 220 Rather, the burden of the flow control ordinances fell
as well on in-state waste processors. Indeed, given the location of
Oneida and Herkimer counties in central New York, it was highly
unlikely that only out-of-state waste processors were harmed or-more
importantly from the standpoint of deliberative equality-that the
counties had given greater regard to in-state waste processors than
out-of-state processors in considering the measure. In short, given the
significant presence of in-state interests burdened by the measure, it
was unlikely that the counties had acted on parochial considerations
in violation of deliberative equality. Certainly, the plaintiffs offered
no evidence suggesting the contrary.
In contrast, deliberative equality would have produced the oppo-
site result in Davis. Kentucky's tax on the interest on out-of-state
municipal bonds is nothing more than a tariff, and, like all tariffs on
out-of-state goods and services, it is manifestly a violation of delibera-
tive equality. Kentucky's protectionist purpose is manifest: it seeks to
discourage its residents from purchasing out-of-state municipal bonds
and, concomitantly, to encourage them to purchase in-state municipal
bonds so as to promote its own public financing needs.221 As such, it
is imposing a burden on out-of-state governments (and their taxpay-
ers), which are denied access to Kentucky's capital markets on equal
footing with Kentucky and its local governments. Yet, Kentucky
clearly dismissed that burden entirely; indeed, nothing else plausibly
explains Kentucky's decision to exempt its own municipal bonds from
taxation but not those issued by its sister states or their political subdi-
visions. 222 This is a classic failure of equal regard and, therefore, a
patent violation of deliberative equality.
Interestingly, before the Court, Kentucky defended its refusal to
give any consideration of the impact of its tax on other states and their
local governments-that is to say, Kentucky proudly admitted its viola-
tion of deliberative equality.223 Though such post hoc statements
made subsequently in the context of judicial proceedings are not
strictly relevant-deliberative equality focuses on the legislature's
deliberations at the time the measure is enacted, not how the state's
lawyers may subsequently defend the measure in ensuing judicial pro-
ceedings-Kentucky's litigation position offers valuable insight into
220 United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797.
221 Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1803 (2008).
222 Further (and subsequently) confirming the violation of deliberative equality,
Kentucky argued to the Court that the only burden of consequence is that felt by its
own local taxpayers. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 210, at 24-25.
223 See id. at 28.
[VOL. 84:1
2008] FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 467
and confirmation of Kentucky's disregard for its sister states. Specifi-
cally, Kentucky argued that other states did not warrant consideration
by it because they provide no services to Kentucky residents.224 As a
factual matter, that is not correct, 225 but, even if it were, it is beside
the point from the standpoint of deliberative equality. A state cannot
excuse its failure of deliberative equality on the ground that outside
interests do not deserve equal regard for some reason-equal regard
is something owed to outside interests by virtue of our federal union,
not by virtue (as Kentucky would have it) of their provision of services
to in-state residents.
In sum, United Haulers and Davis reflect the shortcomings of a
constitutional regime premised on antiprotectionism or virtual repre-
sentation. The Court's decision in United Haulers undoubtedly
reflected a desire to provide state and local governments with greater
regulatory autonomy-to free them from the strictures of constitu-
tional limits that the Court perceived as too stringent. The Court sim-
ply and instinctively did not believe that Oneida and Herkimer
counties had acted unconstitutionally. The problem arose from the
fact that the Court could not find a way to reconcile the flow-control
ordinances with either of its prevailing theoretical models in a coher-
ent fashion. Unwilling to jettison the models, it was forced to recon-
ceptualize them in a more narrow, unprincipled fashion that validated
the flow control ordinances. Hence, the Court redefined the antipro-
tectionism model to exclude public protectionism and limited the vir-
tual representation model to only those state measures whose burdens
are felt exclusively out-of-state-a null set.
Davis, in turn, illuminates the danger of the theoretical missteps
made in United Haulers. Having redefined the antiprotectionist model
to categorically exclude sovereign protectionism, the Court was left
with no option but to uphold a patently protectionist tariff on out-of-
state municipal bonds. Even worse, in embracing such protectionism,
the Court opened the door to myriad other forms of sovereign protec-
tionism.226 If a state can tax out-of-state municipal bonds, it can ban
their purchase by residents. 227 If a state can require its own citizens to
use state-owned garbage dumps, so too can it require all state school
224 See id.
225 Other states provide services, such as roads, parks, police and fire protection,
and courts, to Kentucky residents that do business in or visit those states.
226 For a full account of the possibilities, see Williams & Denning, supra note 187.
227 Id. at 52.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
children to attend in-state public schools228 or demand that all state
construction contractors purchase their cement from the state-owned
cement factory.229 The Court's response to such fears-that Congress
can address any problems that might arise by statutorily forbidding
sovereign protectionism in particular industries230-is woefully
insufficient.
23 1
The mistakes made in United Haulers and Davis will haunt the
Court and country for years to come. That is all the more unfortunate
because it need not have been this way. Under deliberative equality,
state and local governments may enact tax or regulatory measures that
displace private or public competition so long as they provide equal
regard to out-of-state interests as they do in-state interests. Hence,
while Davis would have come out differently, the Court could have
upheld the Oneida and Herkimer solid waste flow control ordinances
in United Haulers without endorsing sovereign protectionism. Prop-
erly understood, the dormant Commerce Clause provides ample
room for state and local governments to address pressing local
problems. As a consequence, the Court's fascination with sovereign
protectionism is both misguided and unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Free trade, both interstate and international, involves the issue of
borders: to what extent should the fact that trade crosses a border
matter to its permissibility? Common market systems attempt to pro-
mote free trade by minimizing the significance that attaches to bor-
ders. In a perfect common market, the border is inconsequential-
trade and commerce proceeds as if within a unitary nation. But
therein lies the rub: in a federal system, such as the United States,
internal borders are an inherent component of the constitutional
order. States, by virtue of their constitutional status, may enact certain
228 But see Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that state law
requiring all elementary school children to attend public schools violated Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause).
229 Cf Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding state requirement
banning out-of-state individuals from purchasing cement from state-owned cement
plant).
230 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Heckimer Solid Waste Mgmt., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1797 n.7 (2007).
231 See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) Uackson, J., concurring);
see also Williams & Denning, supra note 187, at 56-57 (arguing that the large number
of local protectionist measures and the constitutional limits on the legislative process
"make congressional action difficult as a formal matter and therefore unlikely as a
practical matter").
[VOL. 84:1
2008] FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 469
measures of their choosing, and some of those measures will undoubt-
edly have trade-inhibiting effect.
Reconciling the competing demands of free interstate trade and
state autonomy is not an easy task. It has confronted the courts for
nearly two centuries, and it continues to give rise to heated debates.
The principle of deliberative equality, however, provides a coherent,
normatively attractive foundation for performing that inevitable task.
Deliberative equality permits states to regulate and tax interstate com-
merce, but it forbids the states from acting in a parochial manner by
disregarding the impact of such measures on out-of-state interests. In
that way, deliberative equality entails a robust common market in
which parochially motivated taxes and regulations are prohibited but
state regulatory autonomy is preserved. This is the American com-
mon market.
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